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I.

INTRODUCTION

Most publicly traded securities, and in particular those traded in the
financial markets of most advanced economies, are held by investors1
through securities accounts maintained by intermediaries such as
stockbrokers, banks, and central securities depositories (CSDs)2—
1. This article generally refers to an “investor” as the legal or beneficial owner of
securities or other financial assets.
2. See generally INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW
(UNIDROIT), UNIDROIT LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES xxii (2017)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE GUIDE], https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/legi
slative-guide [https://perma.cc/E9ZJ-BZEY] (describing a Central Securities Depository, or
CSD) (“[A]n entity that provides the initial recording of securities in a book-entry system or
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intermediated securities. For many investors, this is the only practical
means of holding and dealing with securities. The infrastructures currently
in use in these markets make intermediated holding through intermediaries
essential and foreclose the option of direct holding on the books of
securities issuers.
These intermediated holding infrastructures impose a variety of risks
and costs. But they persist as the only practical means for these investors
to hold securities primarily because this is the way the systems currently
work.3 The primary beneficiaries of these systems—the intermediaries
themselves—have resisted fundamental changes in the holding systems. I
argue here that the mere existence of these holding systems, and the
benefits enjoyed by their principal architects, do not reflect an appropriate
public policy justification for maintaining and accepting the investor and
systemic risks and costs (including costs of reducing and managing these
risks) that they impose.
This article presents a comprehensive analysis and assessment of legal
attributes and implications of intermediated securities holding
infrastructures. Unlike earlier studies discussed below, this more holistic
study identifies and considers the significant legal and regulatory aspects of
intermediated holding systems. Moreover, it sharply distinguishes the risks
and costs imposed by intermediated holding systems from those attendant
to the trading of securities and the settlement of trades. It explains that an
optional disintermediated holding system is compatible with the
maintenance of legacy trading and settlement structures, perhaps as a
minimally disruptive interim measure.4 This approach recognizes and
confronts the political economy and path dependency impediments to a
more disruptive and comprehensive disintermediation of financial market
infrastructures.
These securities holding infrastructures are complex and arcane. This
likely accounts, at least in part, for their persistence and resistance to
that provides and maintains the securities accounts at the top tier of the intermediated
holding chain. The entity may provide additional services such as clearing, settlement and
processing corporate actions. It plays an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of
securities issues.”); UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated
Securities, UNIDROIT (Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter GSC], http://www.unidroit.org/instrumen
ts/capital-markets/geneva-convention [https://perma.cc/WV6Z-7BZG] (reflecting an
important and emerging international consensus, or common understanding, as to many
aspects of intermediated securities).
3. See text at notes 59–62.
4. Reference to “disintermediation” here generally refers to the adoption of direct,
transparent holding systems. For a discussion of “direct” versus “indirect” and
“transparent” versus “nontransparent” holding systems. See infra Part II.
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regulatory reforms. One benefit to which this study aspires is to make the
invisible visible. While it does not undertake an empirical cost-benefit
analysis, the study does provide a useful framework for that analysis.
This article proposes a holding structure that would reduce
intermediary risk and, along the way, would ameliorate several other
problematic attributes of current intermediated securities holding
infrastructures. I refer to this approach as the “new platform” system
(NPS). The NPS would connect the holdings of participating investors
directly to the issuers of securities—disintermediated or “direct” holding.
This approach would reduce or eliminate intermediary risk imposed by
these holding infrastructures in relevant domestic markets, and also would
facilitate the shortening of custody chains across international borders.
Disintermediation of holding structures is fully compatible with retaining
the many essential roles of intermediaries and intermediation in contexts
such as trading on exchanges or other trading platforms, and the clearing
and settlement of securities transactions.5 The discussion here focuses
primarily on examples drawn from the relevant prevailing financial
infrastructures, legal rules, and market practices in the United States.
United States law, regulation, and market infrastructure exemplifies a
relatively “pure” version of a nontransparent intermediated holding
system.6 But the NPS and the discussion of intermediated holding have
global relevance.
Implementing the disintermediation of securities holding under the
NPS would require modifications of current holding infrastructures, but
fundamental changes may be on the horizon in any event.7 The global
financial markets—such as the markets for securities, derivatives, and the
broad penumbra of financial products around each—are not only complex,
but also are constantly and rapidly evolving. Much of this market
complexity is a necessary result of the wide variety of market participants,
financial products, legal and regulatory regimes that persist, the
corresponding financial market infrastructures that have emerged globally
to serve these markets, and the reality that the financial markets are global
and interconnected across national borders.
Financial technology, or FinTech,8 is at the forefront of this rapid
5. See infra pp. 41–46 (discussing operation of the NPS following trading and
settlement processes).
6. See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (discussing “omnibus” account
holding systems).
7. See note 302 and accompanying text (adding that the emergence of Fintech may
facilitate basic changes in securities holding infrastructures).
8. See Julia Kagan, Financial Technology – Fintech, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), ht
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evolution. As George Walker has summarized this phenomenon:
FinTech has emerged as a powerful new market force as a result
of the coming together of a number of disconnected trends.
Significant advances have occurred in the areas of computer and
digital technology, the Internet, mobile telecommunications as
well as economics and finance, which have transformed
traditional areas of study and created important potential new
business structures and operations.9
This article focuses on FinTech in the specific context of
intermediated securities. It aspires to harness the momentum of FinTech to
address and overcome a host of persistent risks, costs, and inefficiencies
that arise from the central attribute of intermediated holding systems—
intermediation itself.
Much of the current FinTech discussion and experimentation focuses
on “blockchain” technology, which is a subset of distributed ledger
technology, or DLT.10 This technology has been most commonly
associated with Bitcoin, a digital currency (or “cryptocurrency”) platform.11
While Bitcoin may be the most visible and publicized blockchain system in
operation to date, DLT proponents have been eager to move the
conversation beyond digital currencies and towards the utility and
adaptation of DLT in other areas of FinTech. Indeed, many of the most
important financial market participants have already commenced
investments and experimentation in DLT and expressed strong interest in
DLT as an important component of FinTech’s future.12 The concept of

tp://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fintech.asp#ixzz4aZxr0YMG [https://perma.cc/7KC4-Y
2M3] (describing the expansion of the term Fintech to include any technological innovation
in the financial sector, including innovations in financial literacy and education, retail
banking, investment and even crypto-currencies, like Bitcoin).
9. George Walker, Financial Technology Law—A New Beginning and a New Future,
50 INT’L LAW. 137 (2017).
10. See generally Luke Fortney, Blockchain Explained, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 10, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp
[https://perma.cc/R6G6-CFH2]
(providing an overview of the technical mechanics underlying blockchain technology).
11. See Scott Likens, Making Sense of Bitcoin, Cryptocurrency and Blockchain,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/financi
al-services/fintech/bitcoin-blockchain-cryptocurrency.html
[https://perma.cc/J6A8-5L92]
(defining each of the relevant technologies and their interconnection with each other).
12. See generally Prableen Bajpai, How Stock Exchanges Are Experimenting with
Blockchain Technology, NASDAQ (June 12, 2017), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/how-stoc
k-exchanges-are-experimenting-with-blockchain-technology-cm801802 [https://perma.cc/A
L9R-R2P7] (discussing the ways in which stock exchanges around the world are
experimenting with blockchain); see also Australian Sec. & Invs. Comm’n, ASX Media
Release – ASX Selects Distributed Ledger Technology to Replace CHESS, ASX (Dec. 7,
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facilitating securities trades with DLT has also been well received in
corporate law, in principle, if not in practice; the state of Delaware now
allows corporations to maintain corporate records, including shareholder
lists, and transfers of stock on a distributed ledger database.13 To date the
many claims and predictions that DLT will produce radical and profound
changes in the financial markets reflect more hype and hope than actual
happenings.14
In the FinTech space, the DLT-related initiatives and discussions by
and among important financial market institutions have emphasized the
potential efficiency gains—in effect, allowing existing institutions to do
what they do now better. For example, a thoughtful and balanced white
paper by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) identified
DLT’s potential for enforcing industry standards, enhancing operational
efficiencies, reducing time and risk in completing transactions, providing
beneficial transparency, and improvement in security for processes and
data.15 Of course, improvements in all of these areas would benefit all
2017), https://www.asx.com.au/documents/investor-relations/ASX-selects-distributed-ledg
er-technology-to-replace-CHESS.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ34-GQMA] (announcing that the
Australian Securities Exchange is in the process of replacing its post-trade clearing and
settlement system with a blockchain-based system).
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 224 (2017).
14. See, e.g., DTCC, EMBRACING DISRUPTION: TAPPING THE POTENTIAL OF DISTRIBUTED
LEDGERS TO IMPROVE THE POST-TRADE LANDSCAPE 2 (2016) [hereinafter, DTCC Report]
(“DTCC believes that distributed ledger technologies have the potential to address certain
limitations of the current post-trade process by modernizing, streamlining and simplifying
the siloed design of the financial industry infrastructure with a shared fabric of common
information.”); Alex Tapscott & Don Tapscott, How Blockchain Is Changing Finance,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 1, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/how-blockchain-is-changing-finan
ce [https://perma.cc/JKP8-F7GZ] (“The unstoppable force of blockchain technology is
barreling down on the infrastructure of modern finance. As with prior paradigm shifts,
blockchain will create winners and losers.”); How Blockchain Will Impact the Financial
Sector, SWIFT INST. (Nov. 15, 2018), https://swiftinstitute.org/download/how-blockchain-w
ill-impact-the-financial-sector/ [https://perma.cc/Q2WV-C3PU] (referencing a Wharton
Professor’s prediction) (“[Blockchain’s] power of eliminating intermediaries is the ability to
lower transaction costs and take back control from powerful financial intermediaries”); The
Trust Machine, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/10/31
/the-trust-machine [https://perma.cc/2EH7-K8KF] (arguing that Blockchain, “[t]he
technology behind bitcoin[,] could transform how the economy works”); Don Tapscott,
How Blockchains Could Change the World, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (May 2016), https://ww
w.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/how-blockchains-could-change-the-world
[https://perma.cc/AK35-F5XT] (interview statement of Don Tapscott, CEO Tapscott Group)
(“[T]he financial-services industry is up for serious disruption—or transformation,
depending on how it approaches [Blockchain technology].”).
15. See DTCC Report, supra note 14, at 9–16; INT’L ORG. SEC. COMMISSIONS,
RESEARCH REPORT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES (FINTECH) 52–58 (2017), https://www.iosc
o.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TT6-BC27] [hereinafter,
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market participants, directly or indirectly, including all types of investors,
although the major benefits would translate into greater profits (where
applicable) and continued entrenchment of institutional participants such as
stockbrokers, banks, exchanges and other trading platforms, securities
transfer agents, and CSDs.
The potential benefits just articulated are commendable, but this
article takes a different approach to potential FinTech advances concerning
securities holding infrastructures. It emphasizes discrete risks and costs
that are imposed on investors in securities under current intermediated
holding systems—in particular, “intermediary” risk (including the failure or
default by an investor’s intermediary) and the related “custody-chain” risk
(risks imposed by holdings of securities through a chain of
intermediaries).16 It is notable that the various explorations of DLT by
major institutions, while emphasizing potential efficiency gains, do not
appear to have focused on the potential for the reduction or elimination of
intermediary risk.17
In contrast, this article articulates concrete
modifications of the intermediated holding infrastructures that would
reduce or eliminate these risks. It acknowledges that DLT might provide
improvements over current, “legacy” technologies for such a modified
holding infrastructure. However, the reforms proposed here do not
necessarily depend on the application of DLT or any other particular
technology. Instead, they contemplate more generally that various risks
and costs imposed by intermediated holding would be eliminated or
reduced by eliminating or reducing intermediation in the holding of
securities.
The technical details of how FinTech might provide practical and
cost-effective means to facilitate this disintermediation remain to be seen.
This article provides a clear statement of concrete goals, targets, and results
at which FinTech is invited to take aim—if FinTech is willing and up to the
task.18 Indeed, a central organizing principle of the article instructs those
with experience in the operation of financial markets and the relevant legal
IOSCO Fintech Report] (detailing a myriad of benefits attributed to DLT).
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See DTCC Report, supra note 14; IOSCO Fintech Report, supra note 15
(demonstrating that neither report addresses the potential benefit of reducing or eliminating
intermediary risk).
18. Even if FinTech could provide a feasible structure for disintermediated holding, it
might well turn out that the “market”—i.e., the various stakeholders, including investors,
intermediaries, other market participants, and regulators—would conclude that such reforms
are not warranted. But it would be a pity (although not entirely surprising) were the reforms
to be rejected largely based on the influence of entrenched interests and the implicit
immutability of existing systems, as opposed to such an objective cost-benefit analysis.
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frameworks and an understanding of prevailing problems and risks to issue
a “request for proposal” (an “RFP”)19 to the FinTech community. It is then
for FinTech to design and offer solutions or concede that technology is
inadequate—at least on a cost-effective basis. It follows that the NPS is a
functional proposal—an RFP to eliminate intermediary risk and address
other prevailing problems through disintermediation—not a technical one.
I describe the NPS here in concrete terms primarily as a means for
clarifying its functional goals and focusing the evaluation of infrastructure
reforms.
Following this Introduction, Part II of the article outlines current
patterns of intermediated securities holding infrastructures. It explains why
post-settlement intermediated holding of securities exists and persists, as
well as opens a window on reasons why such intermediated holding need
not persist. Part III then identifies and summarizes the various risks and
costs posed by intermediated holding systems in the securities markets—
these include those that intermediated holding systems currently impose on
investors, issuers, and other market participants. Although the various risks
are relatively well managed in most intermediated holding systems, this
management imposes substantial costs that ultimately are borne by
investors. Part III concludes by outlining a framework for future work and
a cost-benefit analysis of securities holding infrastructure reforms.
Part IV summarizes and assesses some other recent proposals for
disintermediation or increased transparency of securities market
infrastructures, each of which pays homage in some form to the emergence
of DLT as a potential reform agent. Each of these proposals is useful in
illuminating some of the prevailing problems, and exploring possible
solutions—in particular the potential benefits of DLT in this context. But
Part IV concludes that, in general, these efforts are wanting for three key
reasons: they (i) fail to acknowledge or adequately address several risks
and costs imposed by current intermediated infrastructures, (ii) are too
narrowly focused (in particular on shares and corporate governance), and
(iii) do not explain how important features of existing financial markets
could (or could not) be accommodated by their proposals.

19. See Will Kenton, Request for Proposal (RFP), INVESTOPEDIA (Sep. 12, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/request-for-proposal.asp [https://perma.cc/VL5L-VX
VC] (illustrating that the RFP is an apt metaphor in that skillfully creating a request for
proposal may dictate the success or failure of the resulting solution. If specified
requirements are too vague, the bidder may not design and implement a complete solution
for the problem. If the requirements are too detailed and restrictive, the bidders’ creativity
and innovation may be limited).
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Part V is the heart of the article. It articulates a functional, resultoriented FinTech approach to securities holding under the NPS that would
provide, at least for a subset of willing investors, a disintermediated
holding system that would reduce or eliminate intermediary risk, including
custody-chain risk, and reduce a variety of other costs and related
problematic aspects of intermediated holding systems. The NPS would
directly connect investor holdings with issuers (a form of “direct” holding
as opposed to “indirect,” intermediated holding). The NPS would meet the
needs that have been met in the past by intermediated holding systems, but
without the intermediation between investors and issuers which such
systems currently impose. Part V explains how the NPS might be
implemented with a minimum disruption of current practices of securities
trading, clearance and settlement, and holding.
Viewed from a political economy perspective, the NPS is not
proposed as an “optimal solution” to the reduction of risk and enhanced
efficiency in the financial markets. It is better seen as in interim or secondbest step. This incremental approach would enhance the likelihood that the
NPS actually could be accepted and implemented in the global financial
markets. Given the influence of entrenched interests in maintaining
intermediated holding systems, disintermediation likely would require
regulatory intervention. That intervention might be encouraged and
opposition blunted by reducing the disruption to current market structures
and practices. By preserving current structures for trading and settlement,
the NPS may offer the best prospect for reform in the near term. Part V
further explains that disintermediation of securities holding along the lines
of the NPS could eventually eliminate the need for intermediated holding
systems as now known. Intermediaries would continue to play important
roles in the securities markets after implementation of the NPS. But for
participating investors the NPS could eliminate intermediation (and the
need for intermediation) in the post-settlement holding of securities.
Having described and assessed the NPS proposal in Part V, Part VI
then considers whether DLT might be employed in the operation of the
NPS. It explains how the NPS architecture could provide a “primordial
soup” of sorts for the implementation of DLT through disintermediation
and the connection of important market participants in ways that extend
beyond the NPS holding structure. The NPS could thereby provide a
gateway for an even broader replacement of legacy securities market
infrastructures.
Part VII explores the prospects for the actual adoption and
implementation of the NPS. It examines its potential for both preservation
and disruption of current practices, the challenges presented by persistent
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path dependence and likely responses of entrenched financial market
institutions and other market participants, and the potential role and
involvement of financial market regulators. In particular, Part VII
considers how governments and regulators might be instrumental in the
implementation of the NPS in the major global financial markets. It also
addresses important technical and practical aspects of implementation,
including necessary modifications of law and agreements. Part VIII
concludes the article and summarizes its contributions.
II.

PREVAILING INTERMEDIATED HOLDING INFRASTRUCTURES:
WHY INTERMEDIATED HOLDING?

Intermediation plays a crucial role in the securities markets. Others
have thoughtfully explored this ground.20 For example, Tom Lin has
explained the difficulties and improbability of substantial
disintermediation.21 He argues persuasively that “[t]he core functions of
financial intermediation will remain steadfastly unchanged because of the
interconnected nature of finance and its human users.”22 Mary Jo White,
then-Chair of the SEC, pointed to concerns about conflicts of interest and
investors’ costs. She expressed concern about “[w]hether intermediation
has appropriately harnessed competition and technology in the service of
investors”23 and asked: “Are the benefits being realized by investors?”24
This article aims to answer Chair White’s question in the discrete—but
enormously significant—context of intermediated holding of securities.
Figure 1 illustrates a typical, although simplified, intermediated
holding structure involving tiers of intermediaries, with each intermediary
having its own set of account holders.25
20. See, e.g., Alessio M. Pacces, Financial Intermediation in the Securities Markets:
Law and Economics of Conduct of Business Regulation, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 479
(2000); Tom C.W. Lin, Infinite Financial Intermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643
(2015).
21. Lin, supra note 20, passim.
22. Lin, supra note 20, at 658.
23. See Mary Jo White, Intermediation in the Modern Securities Markets: Putting
Technology and Competition to Work for Investors, SEC (June 20, 2014), https://www.sec.g
ov/news/speech/2014-spch062014mjw [https://perma.cc/P3EX-CV53] (speaking about the
current state of the securities market at the Economic Club of New York).
24. Id.
25. See GSC, supra note 2, at arts. 1(a) (defining “securities”); 1(b) (defining
“intermediated securities”); 1(c) (defining “securities account”); 1(e) (defining “account
holder”); 1(d) (defining “intermediary”); 1(g) (defining “relevant intermediary”) (noting that
this article primarily uses the terminology used in the GSC in discussing intermediated
securities holding).
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Figure 126
Issuer

CSD
(Intermediary 1)

Account holder
/investor 1
Account holder
/investor 2

Intermediary 2

Intermediary 3

Intermediary 4

Account holder
/investor 3

Account holder
/investor 4

The UNIDROIT Legislative Guide on Intermediated Securities
(Legislative Guide),27 an important supplement to the Geneva Securities
Convention (GSC),28 describes various legal structures adopted by States
for intermediated holding of securities. It identifies “direct” holding
systems as those “in which intermediaries only serve as bookkeepers for
investors and have no interest in investors’ securities” and “indirect”
systems as those “in which intermediaries have an interest in investors’
securities.”29 A more useful explication of the direct-indirect dichotomy is
a functional taxonomy based on which a “direct” holder, under the
applicable law and contractual arrangements, is the legal owner of a
security entitled to exercise directly against the issuer the rights of a
security holder (e.g., as a shareholder or holder of a debt security) and an
“indirect” holder (whether or not it is considered the legal owner) would
not be so entitled.
Notwithstanding this general, high-level direct-indirect dichotomy, the
Legislative Guide also offers a more refined taxonomy of private-law rules
26. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 12 (drawing on Diagram 29-1 with some
simplification and modification); ROY GOODE, HERBERT KRONKE & EWAN MCKENDRICK,
TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: TEXTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 427 (2d ed. 2015)
(drawing on Figure 15.1 with some simplification and modification).
27. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2.
28. GSC, supra note 2.
29. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 16.
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governing the legal relationships and characteristics of these direct and
indirect holding models. Under the “individual ownership model” the
ultimate account holder/investor (i.e., at the lowest tier in Figure 1) has full
ownership of securities credited to its account.30 The “co-ownership”
model confers co-ownership of fractional interests in securities held in a
pool of securities held by the CSD and credited to the ultimate account
holders/investors of an intermediary.31 Under the “trust” model, the
participants (account holders) of the CSD are the legal owners of securities
that the participants credit to the accounts of their investor/account holder.32
The participant intermediaries hold the securities in trust for their
investor/account holders, who are the trust beneficiaries and holders of
equitable interests. The “security entitlement” model provides that each
account holder at every tier in the chain below the CSD obtains a security
entitlement in the securities credited to its account.33 Under this model, an
account holder acting in the capacity as intermediary passes on the rights
attached to the securities to its account holders, and account holders access
securities only through their own respective intermediaries.34 For example,
in the United States under Article 8 (Investment Securities) of the Uniform
Commercial Code,35 by the credit of a “security”36 or another “financial
asset”37 by a “securities intermediary”38 to a “securities account,”39 an
“entitlement holder”40 acquires a “security entitlement.”41
Although the systems and the legal relationships vary greatly around
the world, almost all have in common the power of an intermediary to
transfer securities to some form of good faith purchaser, even without an
account holder’s authorization, and the resulting possibility of a shortfall

30. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 17 (identifying the law of France as an
example of this model).
31. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 18 (identifying the laws of Austria and
Germany as examples of this model).
32. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 19 (identifying the laws of Australia, England
and Wales, and Ireland as an examples of this model).
33. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 20 (identifying the laws of Canada and the
United States as examples of this model).
34. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 21–22 (describing a “contractual model,”
under which account holders acquire only contractual, as opposed to proprietary, rights to
securities).
35. U.C.C. § 8 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) [hereinafter, U.C.C.].
36. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(15) (defining “security”).
37. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9) (defining “financial asset”).
38. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14) (defining “securities intermediary”).
39. U.C.C. § 8-501(a) (defining “securities account”).
40. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(7) (defining “entitlement holder”).
41. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(17) (defining “security entitlement”).
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upon the failure of the intermediary—each an element of intermediary risk
discussed in Part III.
The Legislative Guide also identifies another dichotomy with respect
to intermediated holding systems—transparent and nontransparent
systems.42 A transparent system is one in which the “ultimate” beneficial
owner is known and identified at the CSD level and at each other tier in the
intermediated chain.43 But on closer examination these transparent versus
nontransparent characterizations reflect not so much a dichotomy as a
spectrum of relative transparency in the relationships among investors,
intermediaries, and CSDs.
Delphine Nougayrède’s thoughtful analysis provides clear
descriptions and a useful taxonomy of CSD holding structures.44 At the
nontransparent end of the spectrum are the so-called “omnibus” CSD
accounts in which a CSD participant holds securities for its own account
and for its account holders, including its participants’ lower-tier
intermediaries and ultimate investors, on a commingled basis. This is the
dominant approach in the United States, Canada, and in the major markets
in Europe.45 For example, in an omnibus structure in the context of Figure
42. Id. at 22–25.
43. See Thomas Keijser & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Intermediated Securities Holding
Systems Revisited: A View Through the Prism of Transparency, in INTERMEDIATION AND
BEYOND 309, 331–35 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019) (examining the various
contexts in which transparency is relevant and arguing that the adoption of transparent
information technology systems could provide substantial benefits, even without a change in
law, and that such systems also could provide a catalyst and roadmap for law reforms
affecting securities holding systems).
44. See Delphine Nougayrède, Towards a Global Financial Register? The Case for
End Investor Transparency in Central Securities Depositories, 4 J. FIN. REG. 276, 284–91
(2018) (discussing Nougayrède’s description of CSD holding practices, which in turn relies
on recent reports of the European Central Securities Depositories Association (ECSDA);
ECSDA, ACCOUNT SEGREGATION PRACTICES AT EUROPEAN CSDS (2015), https://ecsda.eu/w
p-content/uploads/2015_10_13_ECSDA_Segregation_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/84NTUQNP] [hereinafter, ECSDA Segregation Report]; ECSDA, THE REGISTRATION OF
SECURITIES HOLDERS (2016), https://ecsda.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016_07_19_ECSDA_Re
gistration_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6QC-2XKJ] [hereinafter, ECSDA Registration
Report].
45. In Europe, even omnibus systems segregate a CSD participant’s own account
securities from client securities. The ECSDA Segregation Report classifies 14 markets as
omnibus markets, including France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria
and Belgium. Although it classifies the United Kingdom as a hybrid system by virtue of the
availability of a form of direct holding through a “personal membership” in the CSD
(CREST), holdings in the UK are nonetheless mostly on an omnibus basis. See EUROCLEAR
UK & IR., PERSONAL MEMBERSHIP (2018), www.euroclear.com/dam/Brochures/Personal-me
mbership-EUI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PP5Z-3ESD]
(discussing
CREST
personal
memberships); ECSDA Segregation Report, supra note 44, at 14–15; In this respect, the
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1, above, Intermediary 3 would know and have a direct relationship with its
account holders, including Investor 2 and Intermediary 4, but it would not
know or have any direct relationship with Intermediary 4’s account holders,
including Investors 3 and 4.
Other systems involve varying levels of segregation of investor
securities. At the opposite end of the spectrum from omnibus accounts,
systems embracing “end investor segregation” involve separate securities
accounts with the CSD for each individual end investor, and the identity of
the investor is associated with each account.46 Even with end investor
segregation, however, the CSD does not have a direct relationship with the
end investor, and a CSD participant manages the securities account.47 This
dichotomy between omnibus and end investor segregation structures is both
more descriptive and offers a more apt nomenclature than the transparentnontransparent appellations. “Transparent” in this context is particularly
misleading—the fact that an end investor’s interest is recorded at the CSD
level does not necessarily mean that the investor’s identity is disclosed to
any particular person, much less made available to the public generally.48
All of these models of intermediated holding systems and their
variations have evolved to meet the needs of financial markets and market
participants. In particular, the intermediated structures are designed to
accommodate the post-trade clearing and settlement of securities
transactions. Clearing and settlement refer to the processes by which
securities transactions (for example, buying and selling securities on an
exchange) are concluded by a transfer (usually called a “delivery”) of
securities and a corresponding payment (the delivery and payment
constituting “settlement”).49 Clearing and settlement may be effected
through a “central counterparty” (or “CCP”), “[a]n entity which operates as
United States also might be classified as a “hybrid” system by virtue of the “Direct
Registration System” (DRS) operated by the Depository Trust Company (the principal CSD
in the United States. See infra Part VII (discussing the DRS and its deficiencies).
46. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 288.
47. ECSDA Segregation report, supra note 44, at 8. This necessarily also means that
the issuer has no direct relationship with the end investor unless the CSD acts as the issuer’s
registrar. Even if the CSD acts as the registrar, the end investor generally is not empowered
to give instructions to the issuer, such as instructions to transfer securities to another person.
48. See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing adaptation of the NPS to the NOBO/OBO system
in the United States).
49. For an overview of the clearing and settlement processes, see DAVID LOADER,
CLEARING, SETTLEMENT AND CUSTODY 1–16 (2d ed. 2013) (explaining a general definition
of “clearing” as being “[t]he preparation through matching, recording and processing
instructions of a transaction for settlement.”). Id. at 2. (explaining that “settlement” may be
defined as “[t]he exchange of cash or assets in return for other assets or cash and
transference of the ownership of those assets and cash”).
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the buyer for every seller and as the seller for every buyer so that the
parties only bear the credit risk of the CCP.”50
Given the volume and velocity of modern securities markets,
settlement could not be achieved through traditional transfer mechanisms
such as the delivery of paper certificates or changes in registration on
issuers’ legacy registries. But these clearing and settlement structures have
achieved more than the replacement of traditional means of transfer
(delivery). Crucially, they also accommodate the payment side as well as
the delivery side of settlement through mechanisms for delivery versus
payment (DVP).51 The background of the development of the national
system for securities clearing and settlement in the United States is both
instructive and illustrative.52
During the 20th Century and until 1975 each exchange in the United
States maintained a separate clearinghouse for its securities transactions.53
The eventual centralization of securities transactions processing was
inspired largely by settlement-related problems. The late 1960s witnessed
a paperwork crisis in the United States. Settlement of trades then required
the physical delivery of paper certificates, and transactions also involved
numerous other paperwork requirements. “The back offices of brokers and
dealers were so overworked that exchanges began closing hours earlier
than the traditional time. . . .”54 Fails to deliver and fails to receive
securities caused enormous losses, trading volumes decreased, and many
broker-dealers were forced to close, enter bankruptcy, or merge.55
From this crisis a number of reforms emerged during the late 1960s
and early 1970s, including the Securities Investor Protection Act of 197056

50. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at xxii.
51. See Alexandra Twin, Delivery Versus Payment, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), http
s://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dvp.asp [https://perma.cc/LQ4L-NN96] (“Delivery
versus payment (DVP) is a securities industry settlement method that . . . stipulates that the
cash payment must be made prior to or at the same time as the delivery of the security.”).
52. Unless otherwise noted, the following discussing of securities clearing and
settlement is based on WILLIAM DENTZER, THE DEPOSITORY TRUST COMPANY: DTC’S
FORMATIVE YEARS AND CREATION OF THE DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION
(2008); Neal L. Wolkoff & Jason B. Werner, The History of Regulation of Clearing in the
Securities and Futures Markets, and Its Impact on Competition, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
313 (2010); LOADER, supra note 49.
53. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at xxii (explaining that a clearinghouse (now
often referred to as a “central counterparty” or “CCP”) functions to guarantee performance
of both sides of trades).
54. Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 52, at 317.
55. Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 52, at 317–18.
56. Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 52, at 319.
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and increased centralization of clearing and settlement processes.57 Most
significant for the present discussion was the development of securities
depositories, a development that eventually resulted in the creation of the
Depository Trust Company (DTC) as the dominant CSD in the United
States—a situation that persists today.58 By immobilizing securities
certificates held in a depository such as DTC, transfers of interests in
securities could be achieved by book entries to the accounts of its (brokerdealer and bank) participants (such as Intermediary 2 in Figure 1) and, in
turn, book entries by those participants to their account holders (such as
Intermediary 3 and Investor/Account Holder 1 in Figure 1).
For present purposes, it is important to identify precisely the work that
intermediation is performing—it facilitates the delivery side of securities
settlement, which also facilitates DVP mechanisms. These observations are
pertinent not only for the United States markets but for the global
intermediated holding systems more generally.59 As Nougayrède has
observed, the “complexities [of national laws dealing with intermediated
securities] never seriously constrained the development of the markets.
One of the reasons is that these differences in national frameworks were
operationally ‘bridged’ by the CSDs.”60 Because intermediated securities
are “in the system,” the intermediated infrastructure provides continual
assurance (pre- and post-trade) that the intermediated securities will be
available and free of obstacles to delivery (transfer) at the appropriate time
in the applicable post-trade settlement system.61 This explains why many
investors continue to “hold” through an intermediary after acquisition (i.e.,
post settlement). By holding in the intermediated system, the investor

57. Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 52, at 319–24.
58. In 1999, DTC and National Securities Clearing Corporation (the principal clearing
organization and CCP in the United States market) became subsidiaries of a newly formed
holding company, The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC). See Paolo
Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When Skin in the Game Is Not Enough, the
Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 601 (2017) (discussing a critical
assessment of DTC); DENTZER, supra note 52, at 72.
59. See Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 281–84 (discussing background of development
of CSDs and their roles in global securities markets).
60. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 284.
61. A challenge for the NPS (and any direct holding model) would be to preserve the
flexibility of existing intermediated systems that accommodate transactional patterns of
financing, collateralization, and securities lending. See Joanna Benjamin & Louise Gullifer,
Stewardship and Collateral: The Advantages and Disadvantages of the No Look Through
System, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 215, 217–22, 233–36 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer
Payne eds., 2019) (explaining that intermediated holding systems promote, inter alia,
effective risk management by securities finance market participants and proposing a
bifurcated system for traditional investors on one hand and securities financers on the other).
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maintains the liquidity of its investments and avoids the technical and
logistical obstacles (including delay and expense) to the removal of
securities from the system, connection of the investor with the issuer (such
as by the issuance and delivery of a registered certificate and/or registration
of the investor’s interest on the issuer’s books), and re-insertion of
securities into the intermediated system (reversing the issuer-related
transactions) for any subsequent disposition or other transaction.62
This explanation and rationalization for intermediated holding begs
the question of why such obstacles to the withdrawals and insertions of
securities from and to the systems exist. The answer is straightforward and
clear: It is in the interest of the intermediaries and CSDs to keep the
securities in the intermediated holding system, and they have no incentive
to make ingress and egress user friendly. This issue is considered further in
Part VII in the context of implementation of the NPS.
Aside from its role in facilitating the processes of trading and
settlement described above, post-settlement intermediated holding may
provide (or, at least, support) additional services that intermediaries provide
to account holders. Consider two important services that broker-dealers in
the United States provide—extending credit to entitlement holders secured
by securities credited to securities accounts (so-called “margin lending”)
and securities lending.
Broker-dealers routinely make loans to their customers (entitlement
holders) secured by securities held in margin accounts. Margin lending not
only offers an important benefit for customers but also is a profitable line
of business for broker-dealers.63 The Customer Protection Rule64 of the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) facilitates these
transactions by permitting broker-dealers to create security interests in
customer securities and to lend customer securities.65 The broker-dealers
62. For example, if an investor in the United States wishes to have a paper certificate
issued and registered in its name, a nontrivial delay would occur before a certificate is
issued and received by the investor. In order to sell the securities, the investor would have
to endorse the certificate and have its signature guaranteed so that the securities can be put
back into the intermediated system. This process takes time and imposes expenses on the
investor. See Holding Your Securities Get the Facts, SEC (Mar. 4, 2003), https://www.sec.g
ov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsholdsechtm.html [https://perma.cc/9FG9B7LW]; FAQS: How Issuers Work with DTC, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/settlement-andasset-services/issuer-services/how-issuers-work-with-dtc [https://perma.cc/RRL6-KGML].
63. Paul Meyer, Securities-Based Lending, SEC. LITIG. & CONSULTING GROUP, https://w
ww.slcg.com/pdf/workingpapers/securities-based-lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBN9-E4F
7] (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) (“Substantial profit margins in the lending business make
SBLs [securities-based loans] a lucrative product for broker-dealers.”).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2019).
65. See infra Part V.B.7 (discussing the Customer Protection Rule and NPS
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may fund loans to customers with their own borrowings secured, in turn, by
these customer securities. More frequently broker-dealers obtain funding
by lending customer securities, with the securities borrowers’ obligations to
return like securities being secured by cash collateral.66
The intermediated holding system in the United States also facilitates
the treatment of fails to deliver securities in the settlement system. Under
the “continuous net settlement” system, fails to deliver securities at
settlement are routinely carried over and netted for settlement on the
following day.67 However, customer accounts normally would be credited
for securities even though they have not yet been received.68
While much of this flexibility for margin lending, securities lending,
and fails could be preserved under the NPS,69 some other proposals for
direct holding fail even to recognize or address these considerations.70 A
challenge for the NPS and any direct-holding system will be to
accommodations).
66. “In a securities lending transaction the lender transfers outright ownership of
securities to the borrower and the borrower agrees to redeliver like securities to the lender at
an agreed time in the future.” Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Truth About Shortfall of
Intermediated Securities: Perspectives Under the Geneva Securities Convention, United
States Law, and the Future European Legislation, in INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES: THE
IMPACT OF THE GENEVA SECURITIES CONVENTION AND THE FUTURE EUROPEAN LEGISLATION
160, 170 n.43 (Pierre-Henri Conac, Ulrich Segna & Luc Thévenoz eds., 2013). Borrowers
of securities typically do so in order to deliver the securities under a short sale. Id. at 174.
The seller in a short sale “hopes to acquire the same securities at a lower price in the future
in order to return them to the [securities] lender.” Id. at 174 n.64.
67. Alistair Milne, Central Securities Depositories and Securities Clearing and
Settlement: Business Practice and Public Policy Concerns, in ANALYZING THE ECONOMICS
OF FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 344 (Martin Diehl et al. eds., 2016); see also
Equity, Corporate and Muni Debt Transaction Processing, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/set
tlement-and-asset-services/settlement/equity-corporate-debt [https://perma.cc/7DJW-BABF]
(describing the DTC’s settlement service).
68. See Division of Market Regulation: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions
Concerning Regulation SHO, Answer to Question 7.1, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/
marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm [https://perma.cc/7WC8-KH24] (last visited Jan. 26, 2020)
(emphasis added): “There is significant confusion relating to the fact that the aggregate
number of positions reflected in customer accounts at broker-dealers may in fact be greater
than the number of securities issued and outstanding. This is due in part to the fact that
securities intermediaries, such as broker-dealers and banks, credit customer accounts prior
to delivery of the securities. For most securities trading in the U.S. market, delivery
subsequently occurs as expected. However, fails to deliver can occur for a variety of
legitimate reasons, and flexibility is necessary in order to ensure an orderly market and to
facilitate liquidity.”
69. See infra Part V.B.7 (discussing NPS accommodation of margin lending, securities
lending, and fails to deliver/receive). This would especially be so if and while the option of
holding through the legacy intermediated holding system remained available.
70. See infra Part IV (discussing various proposals for disintermediation).
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accommodate sufficient flexibility for preservation of valuable
transactional patterns and to meet political opposition based on perceived
threats to established market practices.
III.

RISKS AND COSTS IMPOSED BY INTERMEDIATION

Intermediaries play vital roles in securities markets. For example,
brokers accommodate trading on exchanges and other trading platforms.
Brokers and other intermediaries are essential actors in modern systems for
clearing and settlement of securities trades. Bank custodians provide many
services to institutional investors, including reliable recordkeeping. These
are essential and beneficial functions. But this Part identifies and describes
a variety of risks and costs imposed by intermediation in the securities
markets. It puts in context a principal focus of this article—the risks and
costs imposed by post-settlement holding through intermediaries and the
attendant methods and costs of addressing these risks. It sets the stage for
consideration and assessment of the development of the NPS proposal—a
market infrastructure that would, post-settlement, eliminate or reduce these
post-settlement risks and costs by allowing investors to connect directly
with issuers instead of holding through accounts with intermediaries.
A. Settlement-Related Risks
This article focuses primarily on post-settlement intermediated
holding and related risks and costs—in particular, post-settlement
intermediary risk discussed next in subpart B. However, post-settlement
holding persists largely in order to facilitate settlement and thereby to
ensure liquidity.71 For this reason, it is useful to consider systems for
settlement and settlement-related risks before turning attention to postsettlement holding intermediary risk.
An important 1988 report by the Group of Thirty72 (G30 Report)
profoundly influenced modern systems for clearance and settlement in the
71. See supra Part II.
72. GROUP OF THIRTY (G30), CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD’S
SECURITIES MARKETS (1988), https://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_Clearan
ceSettlement1988.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA6L-GVJV] [hereinafter G30 Report]. Significant
later studies include reports by the International Securities Services Association (ISSA) and
follow-up work by the G30. See ISSA, RECOMMENDATIONS 2000 (2000); GROUP OF THIRTY
(30), GLOBAL CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT: FINAL MONITORING REPORT (2006), https://group
30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_GlobalClearingSettlementFinalMonitoringReport.
pdf [https://perma.cc/EHC8-TQVL]. For general background, see LOADER, supra note 49,
at 5–11.
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world’s securities markets.73 The G30 Report proposed “standards for
clearance and settlement which should be set and maintained by national
corporate securities markets to maximize efficiency and reduce risk and
cost.”74 Modern settlement systems are structured to manage these risks.
“Principal risk” in the settlement of securities transactions is the risk
that payment might be made but the delivery of a security would not be
forthcoming or, conversely, that delivery might be made but payment
would not occur.75 Principal risk is managed primarily by DVP systems
that essentially provide for simultaneous payment and delivery.76 But DVP
does not solve the problem of trade failures (or “fails”) in which DVP does
not occur because of the failure of a counterparty either to pay or deliver.
If a delivery does not occur (such as because of a counterparty’s
insolvency) then costs and losses may arise from having to replace a failed
trade with a new trade—”replacement risk.”77 In many cases delivery may
be delayed, even if it eventually occurs, but meanwhile buyers and sellers
that are expecting deliveries and payment are exposed to “liquidity risk.”78
These replacement and liquidity risks generally are addressed in clearance
and settlement systems through the interposition of a CCP,79 which serves
to ensure that settlement will occur regardless of a default by a participant
in the system.80 The role of the CCP and multilateral netting of trades
among system participants results in a great reduction in the number of
trades that must be settled.81 Liquidity risk and replacement risk are also
addressed by institutional frameworks for borrowing and lending securities
and “repurchase” (or “repo”) transactions.82
Additional safeguards backstop the performance of payment and
delivery obligations in settlement systems.83 Settlement risks also have
73. See DENTZER, supra note 52, at 55–57 (discussing influence of G30 Report on
DTC’s system); LOADER, supra note 49, at 5–7 (discussing influence of G30 Report on
clearing and settlement systems).
74. G30 Report, supra note 72, at 1.
75. Milne, supra note 67, at 340–42.
76. Id.; see supra Part II (discussing DVP).
77. Milne, supra note 67, at 342–44. For example, a buyer is exposed to replacement
cost risk if the market price of securities that are not delivered is higher than the contract
price.
78. Id. at 342. For example, a seller that does not receive payment may need to borrow
funds or sell assets to meet its own payment obligations. Id. at 342–44.
79. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at xxii (explaining that clearinghouses, or
CCPs, function to guarantee performance of both sides of trades).
80. Milne, supra note 67, at 342–44.
81. Milne, supra note 67, at 343.
82. Milne, supra note 67, at 344–46.
83. See, e.g., DEPOSITORY TR. CO., DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK FOR COVERED CLEARING
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been reduced substantially by shortening the periods between the time that
a trade is made (trade date) and the time of settlement (settlement date).84
Rules that ensure the finality of settlement payments and deliveries of
securities further reduce risk.85 Finally, these settlement-related risks also
potentially harbor “systemic risk,”86 which is ameliorated by the reduction
of settlement risks generally.
The risks inherent in the settlement of securities transactions have
been managed well by settlement systems in major markets. Indeed, one of
the harshest critics of the United States infrastructure for securities trading,
settlement, and holding has observed that the current system “enjoys
universal respect,” “is fast, secure, and profitable,” and “cheap.”87 But the
risks imposed on an investor by an intermediary’s default or failure do not
vanish at settlement. Subpart B next addresses the post-settlement
intermediary risks that persist when an investor continues to hold securities
through an account with an intermediary.

AGENCIES AND FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 11 (2018), www.dtcc.com/~/media/F
iles/Downloads/legal/.../DTC_Disclosure_Framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA2F-8QVM]
[hereinafter DTC Framework] (explaining that “DTC may pledge or liquidate collateral of
the defaulting Participant in order to complete settlement. Liquidity resources, including the
Participants Fund and a committed line of credit with a consortium of lenders, are available
to complete settlement if there is a Participant default.”).
84. At the time of the 1988 G30 Report the norm for settlement in the United States and
in many other markets was the fifth business day following the trade date (T+5), and the
report’s Recommendation 7 called for settlement to occur by T+3 no later than 1992. G30
Report, supra note 72, at 14. The standard settlement date in the United States markets
moved to T+2 in 2017. Amendment to Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle - A Small
Entity Compliance Guide, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/tm/t2-sbrefa [https://perma.cc/C4BY-2
X5Y].
85. DTC Framework, supra note 83, at 19–20 (discussing settlement finality).
86. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURITIES SETTLEMENT
SYSTEMS 39 (2001) (“If the failure of one participant renders other participants unable to
meet their obligations, the settlement system might be a source of instability for financial
markets more generally (systemic risk).”); Milne, supra note 67, at 349 (noting that extreme
complexity of modern clearing and settlement systems “is itself a potential source of
systemic problems”).
87. David C. Donald & Mahdi H. Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings and Unified Pricing
to Securities Markets with Distributed Ledger Technology 3, 37 (Mar. 14, 2019)
[hereinafter Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings] (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author). David C. Donald & Mahdi H. Miraz, Multilateral Transparency for Securities
Markets Through DLT (Chinese Univ. of H.K. Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 201905, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3352293 [https://perma.cc/Z3SB-UM84]; see also
David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness: The Problem at the Core of the US Proxy System and
Its Solution, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 41 passim (2011).
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B. Post-Settlement (Holding) Intermediary Risk
1.

Default or Failure of Relevant Intermediary

The post-settlement intermediated holding phenomenon results from
demands for convenience and liquidity afforded by leaving securities “in
the system” and the prevailing costs, delay, and inconvenience of
withdrawals and reinsertions of securities into and out of intermediated
holding systems.88 But holding through an intermediary imposes another
set of risks on an account holder consisting of the possibility of loss or
damage caused by the default or insolvency of an account holder’s
intermediary. As I have explained elsewhere: “Intermediary risk is a
function of the structure of a particular holding system, including the
holding infrastructure and its relevant technology, the relevant private law
of property and contract, legal and contractual duties that underpin the
holding structure, the regulatory framework, and the relevant insolvency
laws.”89
First, consider these risks in terms of the rights to which an account
holder is entitled and the related obligations of its relevant intermediary.90
GSC Article 9 provides for the rights conferred on an account holder91 and
Article 10 sets forth the corresponding obligations that a relevant
intermediary owes to its account holders.92 Although the GSC’s functional
approach leaves niceties of legal doctrine to the non-Convention law,93 and
the actual rights and obligations under a given State’s laws may differ,
these GSC provisions provide a useful framework for the present analysis.
Under GSC Article 9, an account holder is entitled to the rights
attached to securities, such as distributions of dividends and voting rights,
the right to dispose of or transfer interests in securities, the right to hold
securities other than through a securities account (if otherwise permitted),

88. See supra Part II.
89. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Global Standards for Securities Holding Infrastructures: A
Soft Law/Fintech Model for Reform, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 531, 532 (2019).
90. See GSC, supra note 2, art. 1(g) (defining “relevant intermediary” as “in relation to
a securities account, the intermediary that maintains that securities account for the account
holder.”).
91. GSC, supra note 2, art. 9.
92. GSC, supra note 2, art. 10.
93. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 35 (discussing GSC’s functional approach
that leaves significant legal and regulatory issues to the law outside of the GSC). The GSC
defines “non-Convention law” as “the law in force in [a] . . . Contracting State . . . , other
than the provisions of” the GSC. GSC, supra note 2, art. 1(m).
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and other rights under the non-Convention law.94 Article 10 provides that
the relevant intermediary must take steps to allow its account holders to
enjoy these Article 9 rights and also must comply with other obligations
imposed by the GSC.95 These obligations of the relevant intermediary
include maintaining sufficient amounts of securities to reflect its credits to
securities accounts,96 allocating securities to its account holders so as to be
unavailable to the intermediary’s creditors,97 acting on instructions of its
account holders,98 not making unauthorized dispositions of securities,99 and
passing on information to its account holders.100
Inasmuch as securities intermediaries such as stockbrokers and banks
normally are regulated institutions, as a practical matter, the wrongful
failure of a viable and solvent intermediary to meet its obligations to
account holders generally is not a problem.101 But when an intermediary
becomes financially distressed, which typically involves the
commencement of an insolvency proceeding, the rights of account holders
may be jeopardized. This generally entails two sets of risks. One risk is
that the securities necessary to satisfy account holder rights and claims will
not be available (i.e., a shortfall). The other risk is that the account holders
will not have prompt and effective access to the securities.
Regulatory regimes, private law, and insolvency law address the rights
of and protections for account holders in this setting. For example,
intermediaries sometimes are required to “segregate” or set aside account
holder securities as a mechanism to enhance the prospect that sufficient
securities will be on hand to satisfy account holder claims.102 Moreover,
both private law rules and insolvency distributional rules address the
protection and priority of account holder claims to securities as against the
claims of an intermediary’s unsecured creditors. In general, securities
94. GSC, supra note 2, art. 9(1).
95. GSC, supra note 2, art. 10(1), (2).
96. GSC, supra note 2, arts. 10(2)(a), 24.
97. GSC, supra note 2, arts. 10(2)(b), 25.
98. GSC, supra note 2, art. 10(2)(c).
99. GSC, supra note 2, arts. 10(2)(d), 15.
100. GSC, supra note 2, art. 10(2)(e).
101. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and
Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305,
363–64 (1990) (“Because the actual enforcement of property interests against financial
institution intermediaries outside of insolvency proceedings is unlikely, it is the entitlement
in those proceedings that is material.”).
102. Id. at art. 25; LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 81–84 (discussing and
diagramming methods of segregating accounts and highlighting, inter alia, the importance
of account segregation and other such mechanisms to ensure account integrity and the
avoidance of shortfalls).
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allocated by an intermediary to its account holders are not available for
satisfaction of the intermediary’s general creditors.103 In many systems,
certain classes of account holders are protected by funds or insurance
schemes, generally up to a specified maximum amount.104 While such
protective schemes may provide ample protection for smaller, “retail”
investors, they generally do not afford protection to the larger, active
“institutional” investors. However, these schemes nonetheless provide
clear evidence that the intermediary risks considered here are real and
significant.
Intermediary risk in securities holding also lies at the core of the
private-law regime for intermediated securities in the United States, as
reflected in UCC Article 8 and the regulations governing United States
government securities. As I explained in an article proposing a new
approach for UCC Article 8, “[i]t appears that the single, most powerful,
control that a market participant can employ to reduce intermediary risk is
to exercise precaution by selecting an intermediary that will not fail.”105
The significance of intermediary risk in securities holding systems is
reflected as well by other features of intermediated securities holding
infrastructures and the relevant regulatory environment. Consider two
relatively recent reports issued by the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) on the protection of client assets
(“Client Asset Reports”).106 The 2014 IOSCO Report adopted several
103. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 82.
104. For example, the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) protects eligible noninstitutional account holders of insolvent registered broker-dealers against losses up to
$500,000. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a) (2018).
105. Mooney, supra note 101, at 388; see Francis J. Facciolo, Father Knows Best:
Revised Article 8 and the Individual Investor, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 615, 635 (2000)
(“Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., the legal academic whose ideas form the intellectual
underpinnings of Revised [Uniform Commercial Code] Article 8 . . . .”) (footnote omitted);
id. at 664 (“Professor Mooney proposed the model of ‘upper-tier priority,’ which became
the intellectual foundation of Revised Article 8 . . . .”) (footnote omitted). The federal
regulations for book-entry government securities as finally adopted embraced the substance
of revised Article 8. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Roles of Individuals in UCC Reform: Is
the Uniform Law Process a Potted Plant? The Case of Revised UCC Article 8, 27 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 553, 572–73 (2002) [hereinafter Mooney, Individuals]. See also Steven L.
Schwarcz & Joanna Benjamin, Intermediary Risk in the Indirect Holding System for
Securities, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 309 (2002).
106. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS (“IOSCO”), RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE
PROTECTION OF CLIENT ASSETS (2014), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCO
PD436.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5BL-Z2V5] [hereinafter 2014 IOSCO Report]; IOSCO,
THEMATIC REVIEW OF THE ADOPTION OF THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN IOSCO’S REPORT:
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF CLIENT ASSETS (2017), https://www.ios
co.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD577.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3ZN-3GVH] [hereinafter
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principles relating to the responsibilities of an intermediary to its clients
(account holders) and to appropriate protections for assets held in securities
accounts.107 The principles embrace standards concerning matters such as
record keeping, account statements, safeguarding clients’ rights and
minimizing risks of loss and misuse of assets, understanding and dealing
with assets in foreign jurisdictions, clear disclosures of protections regimes
and risks involved, arrangements relating to client waivers of protections,
regulatory oversight of intermediary compliance, and regulatory oversight
of domestic rules concerning foreign assets.108 The principles reflect the
vital roles played by intermediaries and related regulatory regimes. They
establish conduct and results that intermediaries, regulators, and custodial
arrangements “should” observe and achieve.109 Even so, shortfalls of
account holder securities in intermediary insolvencies may be expected.110
The insolvency proceeding of an account holder’s relevant
intermediary provides the “acid test” of its intermediated securities
holdings. The laws of many jurisdictions have specialized rules relating to
insolvency proceedings of securities intermediaries.111 Although this is a
complex and arcane area, it is important to note that an intermediary’s
insolvency proceeding may expose an account holder to substantial risk,
cost and delay. Moreover, this may be the case even if the account holder’s
rights are clear and undisputed under the applicable private, noninsolvency
law and even if those rights are generally respected in the insolvency
proceeding. For example, account holders experienced substantial delays
in recovering their securities holdings in the administration of Lehman
Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE) under English law.112 The relevant
English insolvency law and procedures simply were not up to the task.113
This LBIE experience underscores an important distinction between
an investor holding through a transparent intermediated system and an
2017 IOSCO Report]. References to the “client” in this context refer to an investor/account
holder holding through an intermediated holding system. For a discussion of the Client
Asset Reports, see Mooney, supra note 89, at 537–39.
107. 2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 106, at 3–9.
108. 2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 106, at 3–9.
109. 2014 IOSCO Report, supra note 106, at 3–9.
110. See Mooney, supra note 66.
111. See, e.g., supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing protective schemes for
certain investors in case of intermediary insolvency proceedings); see generally
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 96–103 (discussing insolvency law relevant to
intermediated securities).
112. Charles W. Mooney, Jr. & Guy Morton, Harmonizing Insolvency Law for
Intermediated Securities: The Way Forward, in TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW 217–24
(Thomas Keijser ed., 2013).
113. Id. at 219–21 (describing problems encountered in returning client assets).
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investor holding directly on an issuer’s register. Even if the investor’s
interest held in a transparent system is clear, undisputed, and generally
effective in its intermediary’s insolvency proceeding, the investor may be
exposed to serious costs and delays in recovering its securities if the
insolvency regime is not sufficiently nimble. But an investor holding
directly with the issuer would normally be in a position to transfer and
enjoy the benefits of the securities unhindered by any intermediary’s
insolvency proceeding.
That the losses incurred by account holders in actual insolvency
proceedings of intermediaries may not be significant does not diminish the
centrality and significance of intermediary risk in assessing intermediated
holding systems. Even if the various prophylactic measures114 and
protection schemes115 addressing IM risk have generally been effective,
those measures impose costs that disintermediation could reduce or
eliminate. And these costs may exceed the benefits of maintaining the
current systems. That actual losses and damages as a result of actual
intermediary defaults and insolvencies may have been managed well is not
necessarily a sufficient justification for the costs of the maintaining the
status quo.116
2.

Custody-Chain Risk: Failure, Default, or Nonliability of
Intermediary in Holding Chain

The foregoing discussion in subpart III.B.1. addressed intermediary
risk in the context of the default or failure of an account holder’s relevant
intermediary. When an account holder holds securities through a chain of
intermediaries, however, these risks are exacerbated. In this context, the
account holder’s intermediary (custodian) is said to hold through one or
more “sub-custodians” holding between the account holder and the issuer
of the securities. As noted in ISSA’s recent study of custody-chain risks:
A sub-custodian provides custody services with respect to
securities traded in a particular market or jurisdiction, on behalf
114. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing IOSCO Reports and principles for protection of
client assets).
115. See supra text at note 104 (outlining protective schemes for certain investors in case
of intermediary insolvency proceedings).
116. So long as legacy intermediated holding systems would be maintained as an
investor alternative to the NPS, at least some of these costs would remain. But, to the extent
that legacy intermediated holdings were materially reduced, the costs also might be reduced
proportionately. For example, if most retail investors opted for holding through the NPS,
the costs of maintaining investor protection schemes could be reduced or eventually
eliminated.
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of a global custodian who may not have an operation in that
jurisdiction. A sub-custodian may also be referred to as an
‘agent bank’, and its relationship with the global custodian will
be governed by a ‘sub-custody agreement’. In some instances,
the sub-custodian will be part of the same parent group of the
global custodian.117
Eva Micheler has clearly and thoroughly described and analyzed these
custody-chain risks.118 Micheler’s argument, powerfully advanced, is
straightforward:
Custody chains do more than transform direct into indirect rights.
They modify rights. Custody chains reduce investor rights to the
least favourable custody term operating in the chain. . . .
[C]ompared to a directly held asset an indirectly held asset can be
significantly reduced in value. Custody chains make it next to
impossible for investors to claim against issuers . . . . They can
cause securities to become affected by security interests of subcustodians . . . and securities financing transactions . . . .
Equitable interests are compromised by shortfalls caused by
negligence or fraud. . . . Custody chains also significantly reduce
the accountability of custodians. . . .119
She demonstrates that an investor’s rights are not only affected by a
contract with his immediate intermediary, but by all of the other contracts
among the various sub-custodians in the holding chain.120 In effect, an
investor’s rights “revert to the lowest denominator. Any term in a custody
chain that qualifies or limits the rights of a sub-custodian also reduces the
rights of the investor.”121 These custody chains occur not only domestically
but, significantly, across international borders.122
Custody chains, then, impose risks of the failure or default not only of
an account holder’s relevant intermediary but also that of other
intermediaries in the holding chain with which the account holder has no
direct relationship. Because of the absence of such a direct relationship,
the account holder normally will have no claim whatsoever against those

117. ISSA, INHERENT RISKS WITHIN THE GLOBAL CUSTODY CHAIN 14 (2017), https://ww
w.issanet.org/e/pdf/ISSA_Report_Inherent_Risk_February-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5KY6-GQRH].
118. Eva Micheler, Custody Chains and Asset Values: Why Crypto-Securities Are Worth
Considering, 74 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 505 (2015).
119. Id. at 5.
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2.
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other intermediaries.123 Custody chains also aggravate the already
substantial obstacles to an account holder’s exercise of rights against an
issuer,124 considered next.
C. Exercise of Investor Rights (Voting, Corporate Actions, Claims
Against Issuers, Etc.)
Problems created by intermediated holding systems for the exercise
and enjoyment of investor rights vis-à-vis issuers are well known and have
garnered the lion’s share of relevant commentary.125 This is unsurprising
inasmuch as investments in securities are in the wheelhouse of scholars of
corporate and securities regulation law. Moreover, the foundational
circumstance that account holders holding through intermediaries do not
hold on the books of issuers makes this set of problems quite visible. The
extensive treatment elsewhere justifies the relatively brief treatment here,
notwithstanding the enormous significance of these issues. As with
investor rights in an intermediary’s insolvency proceeding,126 differences
between an investor holding directly on the books of an issuer’s register
and holding in an intermediated system—even if the system is transparent
and efficient—are significant.
The seminal study of corporate voting in the United States by Marcel
Kahan and Edward Rock is exemplary. They examined “pathologies of
complexity,”127 “of ownership,”128 and “of misalignment between voting
123. Id. at 8.
124. Id. at 14–19.
125. See, e.g., Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 298–99; Donald, supra note 87; Marcel
Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEORGETOWN L.J.
1227 (2008); Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail
Investor, 102 MINN. L. REV. 11 (2017); George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate
Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227 (2018); Eva Micheler, Transfer of Intermediated Securities
and Legal Certainty, in TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW, supra note 112, at 119–23; Paul
Davies, Investment Chains and Corporate Governance, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND
187–214 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019). See also infra Part IV (discussing
recent proposals for disintermediation and problems associated with intermediated holding).
126. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text (discussing the risks that account
holders bear in an intermediary’s insolvency proceeding).
127. Kahan & Rock, supra note 125, at 1249–55. Earlier studies focused on voting and
other problems in the United Kingdom. See generally OXERA, CORPORATE ACTION
PROCESSING: WHAT ARE THE RISKS? (2004), https://www.oxera.com/publications/corporateaction-processing-what-are-the-risks/ [https://perma.cc/N9MF-WVNM]; PAUL MYNERS,
REVIEW OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO VOTING UK SHARES (2004). Analogous problems exist
outside of corporate shareholder voting as well. See, e.g., Jennifer Payne, Intermediation
and Bondholder Schemes of Arrangement, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 173–86 (Louise
Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019) (discussing voting of bondholders under English law
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rights and economic interest.”129 Their assessment offered severe criticism:
“[t]he existing system of shareholder voting is crude, imprecise, and
fragile.”130 They concluded that “marginal ameliorations are clearly
possible” but that resolving the serious problems with voting would
“require[] a realignment of our system of securities ownership, a change
that is expensive and uncertain, both practically and politically.”131
Aside from voting, suffice it to note that problems created by
intermediated holding systems extend to “corporate actions”132 more
generally.133 In particular, intermediated holding has presented obstacles
for investors seeking to assert claims against issuers.134
D. Costs of Nontransparency
The intermediary risks and investor rights addressed in subparts III.B.
and C. primarily involve adverse consequences for investors and
impairments of investors’ legal entitlements resulting from intermediated
holding systems. As noted, these problems would be reduced or eliminated
by direct holding. This subpart identifies a different set of problems that
arise from the nontransparency of deeply intermediated holding systems.
These costs of nontransparency arise in a several contexts. The problems
might well be adequately addressed by adopting transparent intermediated
holding systems, even without the implementation of direct holding.
However, a direct holding regime such as the NPS might prove to be the
most effective and efficient means of providing needed transparency (while

schemes of arrangement).
128. Kahan & Rock, supra note 125, at 1255–63.
129. Kahan & Rock, supra note 125, at 1263–67.
130. Kahan & Rock, supra note 125, at 1279.
131. Kahan & Rock, supra note 125, at 1281.
132. As Donald explained, “corporate actions . . . is a term used by the settlement
industry to designate all actions requiring communication between issuers and shareholders,
such as rights issues, tender offers, conversions, mergers, early redemptions and dividend
payments.” Donald, supra note 87, at 73–74.
133. See id. passim.
134. See, e.g., Geis, supra note 125, at 238–48, 270–72 (discussing shareholder suits
under state and federal law in the United States); see also Louise Gullifer, Two
Consequences of the Intermediated Holding of Debt Securities: Examining Discharge of
Debt and Set-off, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 155–74 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer
Payne eds., 2019) (discussing discharge and set-off involving intermediated debt securities
under English law); see also Micheler, supra note 125, at 119–23 (discussing enforcement
of intermediated debt securities under English law); Richard Salter, Enforcing Debt
Securities, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 129–54 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds.,
2019) (discussing enforcement of intermediated debt securities under English law).
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providing other benefits as well).135
1.

Anti-Money Laundering, Sanctions Compliance, Terrorist
Financing, Taxation

Nontransparency frustrates the needs of various regulators to obtain
information about investor holdings in order to protect and promote a
variety of public interests that are unrelated to investor rights. For
example, Nougayrède has called attention to concerns about anti-money
laundering (AML), sanctions compliance, and terrorist financing. She
notes:
A push for beneficial ownership transparency in all forms of
legal entities is taking place around the world in the field of . . .
AML. Economic sanctions are increasingly used as non-violent
alternatives to traditional military action in foreign relations,
especially by the US and EU: to be effective, these tools require
transparency in custodial chains and regulators have begun to cut
through these. . . .136
The need for increased transparency also has prompted various reform
efforts in connection with taxation and tax evasion.137 All of these areas
would benefit from increased transparency in intermediated holding
systems (or the adoption of direct-holding regimes such as the NPS).

135. For investors that do not opt in to direct registration under the NPS, the centralized
data collection mechanism required for the NPS necessarily would produce data that would
provide transparency in the intermediated holding system. Even if that data were not
utilized for direct registration under the NPS, it would be available and accessible for other
permitted purposes. However, increased transparency and the loss of anonymity also pose
risks in the form of threats to privacy, confidentiality, and data protection. Panisi, Buckley,
and Arner have wisely advised to “strike a balance” between the privacy concerns and the
benefits of enhanced transparency. Federico Panisi, Ross P. Buckley & Douglas Arner
(PB&A), Blockchain and Public Companies: A Revolution in Share Ownership
Transparency, Proxy-voting and Corporate Governance?, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. &
POL’Y 1, 15 (2019).
136. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 278–79; see also id. at 301–05 (discussing
Clearstream Banking S.A. (Luxembourg) and United States settlement relating to Central
Bank of Iran assets blocked under United States sanctions legislation and debates within the
securities industry on related transparency issues); Keijser & Mooney, supra note 43, at
326–30 (discussing problems of intermediated holding systems in the contexts of AML,
terrorist financing and other criminal activity, and foreign investments in strategic
enterprises).
137. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 306–08.
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Upper-Tier Attachment Prohibitions

Somewhat analogous to AML concerns, nontransparent intermediated
holding systems may afford an investor the means of hiding or shielding its
securities from the reach of creditors. For example, UCC section 8-112
provides that a debtor’s interest in a security entitlement may be reached by
a creditor only through legal process on the debtor-entitlement holder’s
relevant intermediary.138 The GSC contains a similar prohibition on
“upper-tier attachment.”139 The Legislative Guide identifies the basis for
these restrictions:
[U]pper-tier intermediaries usually do not know and are unable to
specify what part of the securities or intermediated securities are
the relevant securities that should be subject to the attachment.
Even if upper-tier intermediaries can identify the relevant
securities or intermediated securities, permitting upper-tier
attachment could produce enormous costs for the relevant uppertier intermediary in identifying the relevant securities or
intermediated securities and could prevent efficient operations of
the intermediated securities holding system.140
A transparent or direct holding system would eliminate the need for
such a prohibition.141
E. Private-Law Rules
The private-law rules governing intermediated holding systems vary
enormously.142 Indeed, the Legislative Guide was inspired by the reality
that only limited harmonization could be realized in the text of the GSC.143
The reality also is that the GSC is not yet in force after more than a decade
and in general harmonization efforts have not been successful. So long as

138. U.C.C. § 8-112(c) (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1992).
139. GSC, supra note 2, art. 22(1) (prohibiting upper-tier attachment).
140. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 78.
141. The GSC creates an exception to the prohibition if a contracting state has made a
qualifying declaration to the effect that it has procedures that eliminate the information
problems addressed by the prohibition—primarily intended for States with transparent
holding systems. GSC, supra note 2, art. 22(3); see LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at
79–80; see also Keijser & Mooney, supra note 43, at 317–19. UCC section 8-112 makes no
such exception.
142. See supra Part III.E (discussing a variety and taxonomy of private-law rules).
143. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that the GSC “leaves various issues
to be defined and determined by other rules of law in force in a Contracting State” and
“complements the [GSC] by addressing these issues”).
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intermediated holding systems exist, of course, these private-law regimes
will be necessary—lack of harmonization notwithstanding. But widespread
adoption of direct-holding systems such as the NPS would reduce the role
and significance of these rules and the inefficiencies and uncertainties
spawned by their proliferation and nonuniformity.
F. Concluding Observations: A Framework for Cost-Benefit Analysis
and Future Work
This Part has shown that intermediated holding systems, and in
particular the deeply intermediated, omnibus account systems in the United
States and major European markets, create a host of risks and costs and are
problematic in a variety of circumstances. It has identified the principal
risks and costs and explained that direct holding and increased transparency
could eliminate or reduce these problems.
But identifying the risks and costs that could be ameliorated through
direct holding and transparency reflects only part of the story. It also is
necessary to consider whether, how, and to what extent various positive
externalities provided by intermediated infrastructures would be affected
by adopting the elements of the NPS. These benefits include in particular
the flexibility that intermediation confers on intermediaries to use their
account holders’ securities. For example, this flexibility accommodates
margin lending and securities lending, which are profitable activities for
broker-dealers in the United States but also provide benefits to account
holders.144 Part IV next considers some recent proposals for direct holding
and increased transparency that generally fail to acknowledge, much less
consider and evaluate, these benefits of intermediation and how they might
be impaired by adoption of those proposals. Part V then outlines the
operation of the NPS and explains how the NPS might be structured to
preserve much of the flexibility of the prevailing intermediated holding
infrastructure.145
The approach taken here provides a necessary framework for
assessing the merits of adopting a direct-holding and transparent
infrastructure. This article makes a plausible (perhaps prima facie) case
that the NPS could reduce significant risks and costs of intermediated
holding while preserving many of the benefits of the current system. But
much remains to be addressed in future work. Empirical assessments based
on a cost-benefit analysis that would support significant regulatory or

144. See supra Part II, at pp. 17–19.
145. See infra Part V.B.7, at pp. 50–56.
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legislative intervention require further qualitative and quantitative analysis
of the factors identified here.146
Consider first the market participants most directly affected by the
existing intermediated infrastructure in the United States—broker-dealer
and bank intermediary participants in DTC, investors, and issuers. For
these stakeholders, the current system is the only game in town for postsettlement holding, but questions abound.147 For example, although the
system benefits the intermediaries,148 are intermediary profits supported by
the current system achieved at the expense of investors and issuers? Would
a modified post-settlement holding system, such as the NPS, lower the
aggregate institutional economic transaction costs? These costs include
those related to reducing intermediary risk, including methods for the
protection of account holder assets.149 Further work should address these
questions, among others.
The analysis also must take account of the various direct and indirect
costs of the intermediated holding infrastructure that lie beyond the direct
and indirect costs that are imposed on securities market participants.150 For
example, the current system may inhibit AML regulation and efforts to
control other forms of corruption and terrorist financing. When compared
to a more transparent system such as the NPS, intermediated holding not
only may increase the costs of monitoring and reporting but it may be less
effective.
This article offers a framework for future work that would pursue a
cost-benefit analysis of the United States securities holding infrastructure
and an assessment of a move toward direct holding and transparency, such
as the NPS. However, the application of such an analysis is beyond the
146. I refer to “cost-benefit analysis” in the broadest sense of examining costs and
benefits and social welfare implications of changes in law and regulation. I take no position
here on methodological issues. Compare Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for BenefitCost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S353 (2014) (questioning
the utility of cost-benefit analysis in setting financial regulation and arguing that costs and
benefits of rules cannot be meaningfully quantified) with Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl,
Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S1 (2014) (arguing that
cost-benefit analysis is appropriate for financial regulation).
147. See supra Part II, at pp. 15–19.
148. See infra Part VII, at pp. 63–66.
149. See supra Part III.B.1, at p. 22.
150. See supra subparts III.D and III.E. Moreover, further investigation and analysis
might demonstrate that the current intermediated and nontransparent infrastructure imposes
material costs in other contexts as well, such as the impairment of financial stability and
national security. Taking account of these costs that are manifested outside of the securities
holding infrastructure per se would be within the SEC’s mandate. See infra note 288; see
generally Part VII (discussing the prospects for SEC intervention).

2020]

BEYOND INTERMEDIATION: A NEW (FINTECH) MODEL

419

scope of this article.
IV.

RECENT PROPOSALS FOR DISINTERMEDIATION: FLAWS AND
LACUNAE

Several scholars recently have argued that disintermediation in the
securities markets (including the adoption of various forms of “transparent”
or “direct”—or both—holding systems) could yield a variety of benefits.
Following are brief summaries and critiques of four recent articles. My
assessments identify some significant lacunae in these proposals and note
several other concerns. But these articles are welcome contributions to the
literature and each offers some useful insights.
George Geis argues that the current mechanics of stock transfer (and,
implicitly, holding) in the United States have great importance for
corporate law.151 He predicts that in the “coming years” DLT is “likely” to
cause a “fundamental transformation” in the processes for settlement of
transactions in corporate shares, although he also notes that such a change
is “contingent” and “not inevitable.”152 Geis imagines that a DLT-based
clearing and settlement process would produce what he calls “traceable
shares”: “There would be a detailed and traceable record of title for every
single share of stock.” He notes that maintenance of such records would
sharply contrast with the existing intermediated holding system in the
United States, based on an investor’s “security entitlement” with respect to
fungible bulks of securities held by intermediaries in omnibus accounts.153
While he offers little detail as to the structure of the DLT system that he
envisages, apparently the system would embrace trading platforms as well
as clearing and settlement. Presumably these records of traceable shares
would constitute (or be a definitive component of) an issuer’s shareholder
register (although the article does not make that explicit).
Geis explains various problematic aspects of the current intermediated
holding structure for corporate and securities regulation law, including
shareholder claims and shareholder voting.154 He then argues that his idea
of “traceable shares” would solve or ameliorate these problems.155 While
151. Geis, supra note 125, at 228.
152. Geis, supra note 125, at 230–31. Geis offers little to support his optimism,
however.
153. See supra text at notes 33–41.
154. Geis, supra note 125, at 238–54.
155. Geis, supra note 125, at 266–76. In particular, Geis argues that “[t]raceable shares
will also offer clarity in situations where legal rights are linked to an earlier disposition of
specific shares and shareholders must prove this link to exercise their rights.” Id. at 270.
He examines shareholder suits under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 and appraisal
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Geis’ analysis of specific issues is useful, these problematic aspects of
intermediated holding systems for corporate governance and corporate
actions and the palliative aspects of increased transparency are well known.
Delphine Nougayrède makes a strong case for transparent CSDs—end
investor segregation156—although she stops short of advocating a directholding structure.157 Even aside from her cogent normative arguments, her
careful and lucid study is impressive for its thorough but nuanced
canvassing of global CSDs, including their roles, historical development,
and various structures.158
Nougayrède draws support for her normative case from several
sources. She notes the transparent systems that have been adopted in
emerging markets, including China and Brazil.159 She also relies on the
corporate governance problems for investors and issuers alike, such as
voting and shareholder communications, which are imposed or exacerbated
by the deep intermediation that exists in particular in the United States and
the United Kingdom.160 For example, she notes the Eckerle case,161 which
denied shareholder status to claimants that held indirectly through tiers of
intermediaries, as a “textbook example of the legal risks resulting from
multiple intermediation in a cross-border context.”162 Nougayrède also
argues that a more transparent holding system could provide substantial
benefits in the contexts of AML and anti-terrorist/sanctions compliance
regulation as well as for the enforcement of withholding taxes in
connection with distributions on financial assets.163 She draws further
support for increased transparency from the potential of DLT and from
what she perceives as an “evolutionary path” toward transparency (albeit in
the contexts of AML and taxation, as opposed to capital markets
regulation).164
Nougayrède provides a valuable and thoughtful synopsis of the

valuation claims as examples. Id. at 270–72. He posits that a plaintiff in a Section 11 case
could check the “chain of title” to determine which shares would support a claim. Id. at
270.
156. See supra Part II (providing a discussion of transparent systems).
157. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 295–308.
158. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 280–91.
159. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 296–98.
160. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 298–301.
161. Eckerle & Others v. Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH & Another [2013] EWHC
(Ch) 68 [2013] 3 WLR [1316] (Eng.).
162. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 299.
163. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 301–05.
164. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 305–08.
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political economy of relevant reform.165 She recognizes the dual challenges
for a transition to more transparent systems—path dependence and the
opposition of financial intermediaries, including CSDs.166 She surmises, I
believe correctly, that such reforms would require a greater role for policy
makers and experts outside the securities industry sector.167
She
acknowledges the important normative question of mandatory
identification of investors to issuers versus an investor’s right to remain
anonymous and the further issue of whether an investor’s interest should be
publicly available.168 But Nougayrède aspires to end investor identification
at the CSD level as a “functional tool,” not as a move that would
necessarily make investor information public.169 She does not consider a
move toward transparency to be a disruptive one that should trouble
securities regulators. But she argues that currently prevailing deep
intermediation imposes hidden costs on both issuers and investors that
regulators should consider.170
Finally, she notes the value of
interdisciplinary research in fields that normally are addressed in “siloes,”
such as securities regulation, corporate law, taxation, and AML.171
David Donald and Mahdi Miraz (D&M) advocate a DLT-based
system that would embrace both trading and settlement and that essentially
would replace entirely existing legacy frameworks.172 Inasmuch as they
acknowledge that existing systems for securities settlement are in general
satisfactory, they call for a cost-benefit analysis of their proposed move to a
comprehensive DLT-based framework.173 D&M recognize that the
beneficiaries of current intermediated holding systems are unlikely to
undertake or support the major market reorganization that they propose.
Consequently, they address their proposal primarily to regulators
responsible for broader market interests, and in particular those of investors
and issuers.174

165. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 308–11. These issues are addressed in infra Part
VII.
166. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 308–09.
167. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 309.
168. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 309; see infra Part V.B.1 (discussing how direct
registration under the NPS proposed here could nonetheless accommodate the NOBO/OBO
system in the United States for permitting a shareholder to object to its identification to an
issuer).
169. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 310.
170. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 310–11.
171. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 313.
172. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87.
173. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 1–2.
174. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 23–28, 38.

422

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 22:2

Like Geis, D&M make the case for a DLT-based settlement and
direct-holding system based on corporate governance problems (mainly
voting and other corporate actions) associated with existing intermediated
holding in the United States. As to voting problems, they rely primarily on
Donald’s earlier study.175
But some arguments supporting
disintermediation in the newer paper do not impress. For example, they
assert that their system would “return full power over the creation of
securities to their issuers”176 and that the current intermediated system
gives financial intermediaries the “power to create securities through bookentry”177 and creates “the risk of overissued ‘shadow’ securities created by
depositories.”178
D&M apparently confound shortfalls in securities
maintained by intermediaries for account holders179 with the problem of
overissued securities that they imagine. The intermediated system clearly
presents problems in the context of voting, but in no way does it impair the
rights (and obligations) of issuers to recognize only holders of securities
that appear on their registers.180 D&M’s whipping boy is the private-law
framework for security entitlements embodied in UCC Article 8, which
they misconstrue and incorrectly describe as having “invented” a “property
right for this essentially contractual relationship” between an intermediary
and an account holder.181 But their critique of Article 8 is misplaced.
Article 8 provides a coherent legal regime for the securities holding
infrastructure that has prevailed in the United States for decades. It
acknowledges and adapts the law to the deeply intermediated holding
infrastructure as it exists. Indeed, if there is a “villain” in the D&M story it
would be the pervasive shortfalls tolerated by regulation in the United
States markets.
Unlike Geis, D&M offer a detailed and thoughtful description of how
DLT could be employed in restructured systems for trading and
settlement.182 They contemplate a private/permissioned ledger featuring an
intraday “lightening” system for instantaneous recording of trades with
175. Donald, supra note 87.
176. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 12.
177. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 11.
178. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 12.
179. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing shortfalls and intermediary risk).
180. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (West 2006) (describing who gets to vote).
181. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 7. I need not
elaborate further on D&M’s misunderstanding of the Article 8 framework, its statutory
predecessors, and its relationship to the intermediated holding system problems that they
lament. On the historical background and development of Article 8, see Mooney,
Individuals, supra note 105 (history and evolution of Article 8).
182. Donald & Miraz, Multilateral Transparency for Securities, supra note 87, at 28–37.
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results reflected in a day-end DLT ledger.183 Curiously, given their
otherwise comprehensive description of their proposed infrastructure,
D&M (like Geis) fail to mention how an investor, in the direct holding
system they posit, would access an issuer’s register and directly control
securities (i.e., effect transfers) without the involvement of an intermediary.
Frederico Panisi, Ross Buckley, and Douglas Arner (PB&A) also
focus primarily on the disconnection between beneficial shareholders and
issuers under intermediated holding systems.184 Their principal claim is
that “blockchain could enable the tracking of share ownership through the
complete settlement cycle, enhancing the ‘shareholder democracy’ of listed
companies.”185 After surveying historical developments resulting in the
prevailing, omnibus account-based intermediated holding systems,186 they
identify several various recent developments from which they conclude that
a blockchain-based restructuring of securities holding systems may be
plausible.187
PB&A argue that a blockchain-based architecture could provide
“ownership transparency” and streamline “proxy-voting” through real-time
identification of “beneficial shareholders.”188 This echoes in general the
similar position advocated by Geis.189 Unlike Geis, however, PB&A stop
short of proposing a direct-holding system and are satisfied to advocate a
transparent approach while retaining current intermediation—thus their
many references (including in the article’s title) to “proxy-voting.”190 In
their view, blockchain could enhance the accuracy and efficiency of voting
mechanisms even within an intermediated system—”the use of blockchain
platforms leads to systems in which voting rights can be exercised directly
and simply by their owners.”191 Similarly, they argue that blockchainbased enhanced transparency also could allow regulators to identify and
183. Donald & Miraz, Multilateral Transparency for Securities, supra note 87, at 13–23.
It is not clear from their description why netting of intraday trades under legacy technology
would not produce the same results as the system they propose.
184. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135. PB&A make many references to
“securities,” but their normative analysis is limited to shares of companies (corporations)
and they do not address explicitly how, if at all, they contemplate that a blockchain-based
system would deal with debt securities.
185. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 2.
186. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 3–6.
187. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 9–12.
188. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 11–12.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 154–155. PB&A cite Geis once with a “[s]ee
also” signal. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 28 n.77.
190. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, passim.
191. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 12. They point specifically to one
model for such a voting mechanism but note that “[o]ther models are available as well.”
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monitor systemic risks imposed by complicated rehypothecation chains.192
Finally, PB&A offer a candid and thoughtful cautionary note as to the
downsides of ownership transparency, especially the data privacy risks;
they advocate a balancing of privacy concerns with the benefits of
transparency.193
All of these authors recognize that current intermediated systems
impose costs on investors and issuers while the status quo generally favors
intermediaries and CSDs. But none of these articles seriously engages with
the claims, analyses, and proposals made in any earlier article discussed
here. The following comments aspire to engage with all four.
Remarkably these observers failed to explore, much less emphasize,
the principal negative externalities imposed by intermediated holding
systems—post-settlement intermediary risk and its attendant costs—and the
potential for disintermediation to reduce or eliminate those risks and costs.
These risks and the myriad prophylactic methods (with their attendant
costs) for their reduction and control have been the cornerstone of the
regulatory approaches to intermediated securities holding systems.194 To be
sure, I make no claim that there is anything wrong with a study and
analysis of particular problems. But it is stunning that articles ostensibly
addressed to lawmakers and regulators seem oblivious to these core risks
and related costs imposed by intermediated holding systems.
That said, it also is clear that the adoption of a direct-holding system
as generally proposed by Geis and D&M would have the laudable effect of
reducing intermediary risk. But neither of these articles examined how the
proposed structures would accommodate an investor’s direct exercise of
rights and powers vis-à-vis an issuer without the involvement of an
intermediary.195 Such a feature would be essential for the systems they
propose to provide the functional benefits of direct holding. How to
accommodate such investor control is a challenging but enormously
important issue in the context of a permissioned DLT-based securities
settlement and holding system as well as for digital assets more generally.
This issue is addressed below in connection with the operation of the
NPS.196
The reforms advocated by Nougayrède and PB&A, while advocating
192. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 12.
193. Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 14–16.
194. See supra Part III.B.1.
195. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the inability to exercise rights directly as an
element of intermediary risk).
196. See infra Part VI (discussing potential application of DLT under the NPS and role
of investor control).
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useful transparency, fall short of a direct holding structure that would
provide investors with direct control over securities.
Moreover, none
of these articles adequately deals with debt securities. Geis and PB&A
focus exclusively on shares of stock and fail to include even a passing
reference to debt. Nougayrède does recognize the important role and
stature of debt securities in the financial markets.197 But “[i]n order to keep
things simple,” she focuses instead on “‘national’ CSDs that handle the
registration of equities (i.e. stocks and shares in corporations).”198 D&M
also mention debt securities, apparently contemplating that their DLT
system would embrace debt as well as equities.199 But they are silent as to
how their system could incorporate outstanding issues of debt securities (i)
evidenced by global certificates, or (ii) required to be held by or through
CSDs. In contrast, Part VII considers how such debt securities could be
dealt with in the implementation of the NPS.
Perhaps most significant, none of these articles confronts the potential
disruption and impairment of flexibility and business practices inherent in
deeply intermediated systems that the respective proposed reforms would
impose. These are particularly significant omissions for the direct-holding
systems contemplated by Geis and D&M.200 These practices include use by
intermediaries of investor securities, including as collateral and for
rehypothecation and securities lending, the treatment of fails to deliver
securities in the settlement process, and the treatment of shortfalls more
generally.201 Parts V and VII consider how these practices would be
affected by and dealt with under the NPS. As noted there, the costs of
eliminating this flexibility could outweigh the benefits of implementing a
direct-holding system.202 While D&M laudably suggest a possible role for
a cost-benefit analysis,203 these omissions substantially weaken the Geis
and D&M stand-alone proposals for a direct-holding system.
Each of these proposals offers support for beneficial changes to
prevailing legacy intermediated holding systems and, in the case of Geis
197. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 282 n.21.
198. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 282.
199. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 28, 30.
200. The transparent systems advocated by Nougayrède and PB&A would not be as
disruptive, however. PB&A also explain that enhanced transparency could provide a useful
means for regulators to monitor risks imposed by, for example, “the abuse of
‘rehypothecation’ [that] can lead to liquidity illusions as well as complicated ownership
knots that endanger systemic financial stability.” Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135,
at 12.
201. See infra Parts V.B.7, VII (discussing these issues).
202. See infra text accompanying note 258.
203. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 4.
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and D&M, potentially improved systems for trading. But implementation
of each proposal also would impose varying degrees of disruption along
with corresponding resistance from interests that would be adversely
affected—in particular from intermediaries and CSDs.204 This opposition
may have enormous influence with regulators and other lawmakers. Even
assuming the most disruptive proposals (Geis and D&M) were optimal,
they will prove to be of little practical benefit if never adopted. Parts V,
VI, and VII build the case that the less ambitious but more palatable NPS
proposal may offer better prospects for meaningful reform. It would
preserve intermediated holding as an option, perhaps as an incremental
step, and accommodate flexibility for rehypothecation, securities lending,
and fails to deliver.
The Geis, D&M, and PB&A studies seem to be inspired primarily by
a desire to advocate the potential virtues of DLT. Curiously, however,
none of them seriously engages in an analysis of whether, why, or how a
DLT-based system would be better suited than legacy technology for the
modified infrastructures that they advocate. (Many readers may note that
these authors’ omissions are not unique in this genre of the literature.) It is
important, here, to distinguish the legacy infrastructures from the legacy
technology. These scholars of legal regimes affecting financial markets are
certainly qualified to weigh in on needed reforms to financial
infrastructures. But in the absence of a thorough and compelling costbenefit analysis of these (potentially) competing technologies, an RFP to
Fintech as to how reformed infrastructures could best be implemented
would offer a better approach than unsupported advocacy of DLT.
Finally, these authors advocate DLT-based solutions for addressing
the particular problem areas that interest them. For Geis and PB&A those
areas are in general corporate actions, primarily shareholder voting. D&M
demonstrate great interest in trading and settlement systems, but they also
emphasize the negative impact of existing intermediated holding systems
on issuers and on the property interests of investors. Nougayrède, on the
other hand, engages in a more holistic assessment of the various negative
effects of deeply intermediated holding systems across the spectrum of
legal and regulatory domains. She addresses DLT as a possible approach
to addressing the problems that she identifies and as an incentive that might
increase the prospects for reforms. My perspective aligns more closely
with Nougayrède’s approach. Appeals for reforms made to lawmakers and
regulators would be more likely to be successful if they identify problems
and solutions for the broad swath of issues affected by legacy intermediated
204. See generally infra Part VII (discussing industry resistance).
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infrastructures.
V.

THE NEW PLATFORM SYSTEM: A FINTECH PATH TO
DISINTERMEDIATED HOLDING

A. General Approach, Assumptions, and Qualifications
The core concept of the NPS is not new. It would connect a
participating investor directly with an issuer on the issuer’s register at the
end of each settlement cycle—direct registration instead of intermediation.
What is new, however, may be the realistic prospect for meaningful (if not
complete) disintermediation of securities holding without a major
disruption of significant features of the current market infrastructures.
What also is new is a central feature of the NPS that would give a directholding investor the exclusive power at any time to transfer securities and
exclusive control over securities that it holds in the NPS.
If the NPS would facilitate the movement of financial assets in and out
of the system and, a fortiori, the transfer of securities within the NPS, it
could be adapted as the primary system for trading and settlement, as well
as holding, and as a wholesale replacement for legacy intermediated
systems. That notion underlies the potential of the NPS as a “primordial
soup,” explained in Part VI. But trading platforms and systems for
clearance and settlement of securities transactions involve much more than
an efficient system for free transferability among its participants. For
example, settlement systems (at least as we know them) must be connected
with both trading platforms and DVP systems. And they must ensure
timely settlements of payments and deliveries notwithstanding a payment
or delivery default by one or more system participants.205
This Part describes the NPS and explains how it would modify
securities holding systems. The goal is not to propose and defend an
optimal structure but to explore the simplest and least disruptive
modifications of the financial market infrastructure necessary to achieve
meaningful reduction of risks and costs through direct holding.
This NPS might be an interim step or it (or a variation) might be
sufficient for the long term. It would not replace all of the trading,
clearing, and settlement processes in a given market but would leave much

205. See supra Part III.A (discussing risks in securities settlement systems and the
mechanisms to manage these risks).
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of the current processes intact.206 This nondisruptive approach could blunt
opposition to implementing the NPS and encourage cooperation by affected
market participants—e.g., securities issuers, transfer agents, brokerage
firms, paying and clearing banks, exchanges and other trading systems, and
CSDs. The NPS also could facilitate implementation in the securities
markets of a DLT-based system earlier than otherwise might be feasible.
As discussed in Part VII, however, potential opposition should not be
underestimated.
In the cross-border context, the proposal contemplates that all of the
major securities markets would establish functionally similar versions of
the NPS that would connect the relevant market participants. Foreign
custodians or foreign investors would have direct access to any foreign
NPS, thereby shortening or even eliminating cross-border custody chains.
This description and analysis of the NPS adopts a “functional”
approach that emphasizes the results, relationships, and effects that the
NPS seeks to achieve. It places much less emphasis on the details of the
necessary technology. It proceeds on the basis that any holding system,
including the NPS, must deal with market participants’ needs that are
currently addressed by existing intermediated holding systems. The
proposal is best seen as an RFP to the Fintech community to create a
system that meets the functional goals and results required of the NPS. On
the other hand, in order to identify and explain those goals and results, it is
necessary here to flesh out some details of the NPS.
The applicable local law (e.g., New York law, supplemented by the
relevant United States federal regulatory regime for securities markets)
would govern the rights of investors participating in the NPS except to the
extent the laws governing the underlying securities and the issuer’s
obligations apply (such as the corporate law governing shares or the law
governing debt securities). One or more “operators” would maintain the
NPS based on software designed to achieve its goals.207 The NPS and its
206. Although the NPS (at least initially) would leave settlement systems in place, I do
not suggest that these systems could not be improved. See, e.g., Milne, supra note 67, at
349–50 (noting complexity in settlement systems and potential systemic risk). But clearing
and settlement are short-term processes and most of the problems discussed in Part III arise
from longer-term post-settlement holding.
207. The NPS proposal is agnostic as to the identity and number of operators. One
might imagine existing CSDs as the logical entities to serve as operators. Or, a
decentralized model could be employed that involved multiple, licensed and regulated
operators, each of which would serve as agents for a subset of issuers. But that
configuration would require sharing of the information in all of the systems, functioning in
effect as a single system. For a suggestion of a similar approach for secured transactions
registries, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Fintech and Secured Transactions Systems of the
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operators would be regulated under the relevant applicable local law (e.g.,
United States federal law regulating securities markets). The operator(s)
would not, however, assume a role analogous to that of an intermediary
under current systems. For example, they would not receive and follow
instructions from investors and they would not incur obligations to
investors beyond the general obligation to operate the NPS properly.
However, as described below, investors could access the NPS directly to
transfer and receive transfers of securities.
Given that old habits die hard, some might think the NPS not suitable
for all investors—at least in its initial, potentially interim, stage. For this
reason, investors would be allowed to opt in to the NPS or to remain either
account holders of intermediaries or direct holders of securities under the
existing legacy systems, which would continue to exist.
For simplicity of explication, this discussion addresses “simple”
securities transactions involving equity and debt securities traded on an
exchange or alternative trading system and clearance and settlement in the
DTCC system in New York. But the essential components and attributes of
the NPS would be compatible with major CSDs and post-trade systems
globally.
B. Structure and Operation of New Platform System
This subpart describes and explains the rights, interests, and status of
an investor holding securities under the NPS. It also outlines the
operational steps and resulting legal relationships involved in the NPS,
including the acquisition and disposition of securities by an investor,
transfers of security interests and other limited interests, broker-transactor
payments and receipts, exercise of investor rights (including corporate
actions and voting), and cross-border custody and holding.
1.

Status of Investor Following Acquisition of Securities

Upon completion of a securities transaction (post-settlement), under
the NPS, an investor would acquire and hold a discrete number of shares or
amount of debt of an issue of securities.208 The NPS itself would constitute
Future, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11–18 (2018).
208. The status of an account holder of a securities intermediary varies widely among
differing legal systems and differing intermediated holding systems. See supra Part II
(discussing prevailing intermediated holding infrastructures). But in intermediated holding
systems the account holder does not actually achieve a direct holding relationship with the
issuer. Id.
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the issuer’s register for purposes of their holdings.209 The number or
amount of securities allocated to investors in the relevant securities under
the NPS necessarily would reflect the exact number or amount allocated on
the books of the issuer. Allocation of securities to an investor would
identify the investor by name (or other identifier). However, the NPS
could accommodate requirements for the protection of the identity of
security holders. For example, in the United States, SEC rules prohibit
broker-dealers from disclosing to an issuer the identity of a shareholder
who objects to that disclosure (an objecting beneficial owner, or OBO, as
opposed to a non-objecting beneficial owner, or NOBO).210 The NPS could
provide OBOs with that option.211
One might be tempted to view the role of the NPS as analogous to that
of an intermediary under current intermediated holding systems. It is
“intermediate” inasmuch as in some sense it lies between the investor and
the issuer—it constitutes a component of the issuer’s register of security
holders. But, unlike an intermediary, the NPS operators would not be
entering debits and credits to investors’ accounts. Instead, as discussed
below,212 in the NPS the authorized investors, broker-transactors, issuers,
and banks would be entering transaction data directly. Functionally, the
NPS is more accurately seen as a variation on a traditional transfer agent to
which an issuer has outsourced responsibility to maintain its register. The
differences, of course, would be that the authorized persons would enter
data directly and the NPS would serve that function for many issuers and as
a part of a unified system that would connect the various market

209. This might necessitate the revision of applicable corporate laws and amendments of
the organic records of issuers, such as corporate charters and by-laws or contractual
arrangements (e.g., indentures or trust deeds) in the case of debt securities. For a discussion
of such amendments for debt securities, see infra Part VII.
210. ALAN L. BELLER & JANET L. FISHER, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, THE
OBO/NOBO DISTINCTION IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR SHAREOWNER
COMMUNICATIONS AND VOTING (2010), https://www.cii.org/files/publications/white_papers/
02_18_10_obo_nobo_distinction_white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6Z8-UYXJ].
211. In the DTCC system, securities held by OBOs would be among with those held on
the issuer’s registry in the name of DTC’s nominee, Cede & Co. The NPS could provide a
self-contained definitive record of relevant information with respect to each participating
investor and its holdings. But to accommodate OBOs, the aggregate number of such
securities held by OBOs might appear to an issuer as a single “omnibus” entry on the
issuer’s registry. In general, the NPS would allow each issuer to have access to the
information with respect to security holders (subject to the rights of OBOs). The combined
NPS records and records maintained in the issuer’s legacy registry would provide complete
records with respect to the security holders.
212. See infra Parts V.B.3, 4 (discussing disposition of securities by an investor and
transfers of security interests and other limited interests by an investor).
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participants. This would distinguish it from a transfer agent maintaining a
stand-alone register for a discrete issuer.
2.

Acquisition of Securities by an Investor

An investor participating in the NPS typically would acquire securities
in a market transaction by retaining a broker-dealer (whose role in the NPS
is referred to as a “broker-transactor”) to acquire the securities in the
market—just as under the current system. In general, the NPS would not
impact the trading processes or the DTCC settlement process.213 The
investor’s payment obligation to the broker-transactor could be handled
conventionally by funding a securities account maintained with the
investor’s broker-transactor.214 Alternatively, the broker-transactor could
be connected directly to the investors’ sources of funding.215
At the end of the settlement process, after all credits to DTC
participants had been made, instead of the investor’s broker-transactor
crediting the investor’s securities account, the relevant number or amount
of the securities would be removed from the broker-transactor’s DTC
participant account and allocated to the NPS for the benefit of the
investor.216
In addition to acquiring securities from sources outside the NPS, an
investor could acquire securities within the NPS pursuant to a “free
transfer” initiated by another NPS securities holder. These transfers are
discussed in subpart V.B.4.

213. See supra Parts II, III.A (discussing the settlement process and settlement-related
risks).
214. Funds that a broker-transactor is entitled to receive or obligated to pay arising out of
NPS transactions settling on a settlement date would be treated in the same manner as other
transactions initiated by the broker-transactor. They would figure in the calculation of the
single netted amount that the broker-transactor is entitled to receive or obligated to pay on
that date. See supra Part III.A (discussing settlement).
215. Presumably a broker-transactor would only act for an investor with a securities
account with the broker-transactor, even if the investor did not contemplate holding security
entitlements in the account post-settlement.
216. The NPS could likewise accommodate inputs from sources other than DTCC
settlement process or internal transfers. For example, a direct holder in an issuer’s legacy
register might instruct the issuer to convert the holdings to the NPS, an entitlement holder
might instruct its securities intermediary to so convert its holdings, or a bank participant in
the DTC might transfer securities to an investor in the NPS.
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Disposition of Securities by an Investor

The linchpin of the NPS would be an investor’s exclusive and
absolute control over directly held securities so as to permit dispositions
(transfers) of securities by investors on the real-time, nonintermediated
NPS platform. This is a defining attribute that would distinguish the NPS
from holding systems that feature transparency but nonetheless embrace
intermediary control over securities.217 An RFP for this attribute would
likely present the most important—and the most difficult—challenge for
Fintech in the development and implementation of the NPS. The
mechanism for investor control in the NPS must accommodate not only
professional, institutional securities market participants but also individual
holders and all types of investors in between. It must be secure, including
its systems for the identification of investors (and transferees of security
interests and other limited interests)218 while also being user friendly. This
challenge is addressed below in the discussion of the potential for a DLTbased NPS,219 but it must be faced and met regardless of the technologies
that the NPS might employ.
An investor’s disposition of securities would in essence be the mirror
image of the methods of acquisition described above. For example, an
investor could instruct its broker-transactor to sell securities and release
(i.e., transfer) the relevant securities to the broker-transactor. On the
settlement date, the investor would receive funds in its securities account or
in accordance with the investor’s standing payment instructions. Or the
investor could transfer securities to another eligible holder within the NPS
(including the transfer of a security interest or other limited interest
discussed below220).

217. See supra Parts III.B.1, C (discussing default or failure of a relevant intermediary
and the exercise of investor rights).
218. On the role and importance of digital identities in financial infrastructures, see
DOUGLAS W. ARNER, ROSS P. BUCKLEY & DIRK A. ZETZSCHE, ALL. FOR FIN. INCLUSION,
FINTECH FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION: A FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL FINANCIAL
TRANSFORMATION 9–11 (2018), https://www.afi-global.org/publications/2844/FinTech-for-F
inancial-Inclusion-A-Framework-for-Digital-Financial-Transformation [https://perma.cc/9N
DJ-PC35]; OECD, DIG IDENTITY MANAGEMENT: ENABLING INNOVATION AND TRUST IN THE
INTERNET ECONOMY 8 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/49338380.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/46TG-FGTZ].
219. See infra Part VI (considering the potential for adopting a DLT-based system for
the operation of the NPS).
220. See infra Part V.B.4.
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Transfers of Security Interests and Other Limited Interests by
Investor

The NPS would provide flexible and versatile mechanisms for the
transfer by an investor of security interests and other limited interests221 in
securities. Unlike outright transfers of securities from one investor to
another investor, these limited interests would be reflected by a designation
in the NPS system while the investor would remain the registered, direct
holder of the securities. The designation would have the effect of
“perfection” of the limited interest (i.e., general effectiveness as against
third parties such as competing creditors and an investor’s insolvency
representative). This system would be similar to designation systems that
exist under other regimes.222 It could accommodate senior and junior
interests created by the investor in the same securities. Moreover, a unique
feature of the system could permit the holder of a security interest to create,
as grantor/transferor, a security interest in the securities. This would
accommodate “repledge” or “rehypothecation” transactions.223
The NPS could provide additional flexibility as well. An investor
could identify a class of securities that would be covered by a designation
without any further action. For example, the designation could apply to all
securities from time to time held by the investor in the NPS or all securities
of a specified type (e.g., described by issuer(s), by class (equities or debt
securities), or other descriptions). Such a designation also could apply to
securities of the relevant class that might be acquired from time to time.
The NPS regime should avoid a rigid “book-entry” system that requires
separate, individual entries as securities of a particular description are
acquired.224 The system also could allow for a designation to be
221. The limited interests could include fractional interests in a security or specialized
interests under the applicable law, such as a usufruct.
222. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, arts. (1)(l), 12(3)(b), (5) (providing for
Contracting State’s declaration that “under its law” an interest may be made effective by a
“designated entry” on a securities account in favor of a person other than the account
holder).
223. See infra Part V.B.7 (discussing repledge transactions by broker-dealers as debtors
in the context of proposed synthetic margin accounts within the NPS). The NPS would be
capable of reflecting a security interest with the investor as debtor and the broker-dealer as
secured party and with the broker-dealer as debtor and the creditor of broker-dealer as
secured party, while leaving the investor as registered holder of record of the securities.
While the NPS designation system might permit an indication of the basic type of interest
being designated (e.g., security interest, repledge, etc.), the actual terms of the underlying
transactions would be memorialized between the parties separately and outside of the NPS.
224. See Kumiko Koens & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Security Interests in Book-Entry
Securities in Japan: Should Japanese Law Embrace Perfection by Control Agreement and

434

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 22:2

accompanied by provision for which party or parties would possess the
right to dispose of (transfer) securities subject to a designation. For
example, either an investor or the investor’s designated secured party might
have such a power, or it might be conferred on the secured party alone. Or,
a secured party of a broker-dealer in a repledge transaction might have the
exclusive power to dispose. In the absence of specific instructions, a
default rule might be established (e.g., a secured party or, if applicable, a
repledge secured party, might have exclusive power to dispose in the
absence of any contrary instructions).
Moreover, the NPS could
accommodate self-executing contractual performance or enforcement of
obligations through “smart contracts” or “transactional scripts.”225
5.

Exercise of Investor Rights (Voting, Corporate Actions, Claims
Against Issuers, Etc.)

Because investors holding in the NPS would hold directly on the
registers of issuers, the many problems imposed by intermediated holding
for the exercise of investor rights could be eliminated. The risks and costs
imposed by intermediated holding in this context were considered above.226
The NPS direct-holding structure would offer a straightforward path for the
exercise of investor rights, such as voting, the assertion of claims against
issuers, and communications between issuers and investors.
The NPS would be structured to handle all corporate actions requiring
voting and deliveries of proxies. The NPS also would be structured to
permit investors to receive communications and take all other actions
through the system.
Although the NPS, at least as an initial measure, would not
incorporate payment mechanisms, the identification of investors in the
direct-holding environment also would facilitate distributions of funds to
investors outside of the NPS. In the United States, however, the
NOBO/OBO convention would complicate the payments process inasmuch
as issuers would not have information as to the identities of the OBOs. For
the receipt of dividends payments, issuers would treat NOBO investors the
same as other direct holders of securities in legacy registers. For OBO
Security Interests in Securities Accounts?, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 761, 794–802 (2017)
(proposing revisions to Japanese law to overcome such rigidity by providing for perfection
by control agreement and for security interests in securities accounts).
225. See Kevin Werbach, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST 160–
63 (2018) (discussing smart contracts, the distinction between contractual execution and
enforcement, and the continued relevance of law and litigation).
226. See supra Part III.C.
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investors, the issuers would pay the relevant broker-transactors for those
investors, as under the current system, necessarily imposing some
intermediary risk.
6.

“Cross-Border” Holdings and Custody Chains

The custody-chain risks (e.g., failure or nonliability of sub-custodian,
inability of investor to enforce rights against issuer, etc.) were described in
Part III.B.2. These risks could be eliminated in cross-border holding
situations in the same way they could be eliminated under the NPS
operating, for example, in the United States. The simplest scenario would
be for an investor in State A to be entered as the direct holder in the State B
NPS. Alternatively, an investor may wish to hold in State B through an
intermediary. It plausibly might consider a global custodian to be better
equipped, as a repeat player, to deal efficiently with the foreign NPS. Even
so, involving only one intermediary would avoid the exacerbated custodychain risk of holding through a chain of intermediaries across borders.
These structures need not raise significant regulatory issues or
concerns in State B (though it might be necessary to clarify that under State
B law a foreign custodian can hold securities through the State B NPS).
Either the investor or the custodian would be holding merely as a direct
holder in the State B NPS. Neither would need to be a participant in the
State B CSD or participate directly in the State B systems for trading,
clearance, and settlement—all of which would be handled by a State B
broker-transactor.
The establishment of identical (or functionally so) versions of the NPS
in all major financial markets would require substantial cooperation,
coordination, and harmonization of laws, regulations, and operations. This
should not be underestimated. But it would be much less challenging than
global harmonization of systems for trading, clearance, and settlement or
creating a cross-border “international” NPS. Moreover, existing and
relevant organizations are well suited to organize the necessary processes
of harmonization for implementation of the NPS.227

227. See Mooney, supra note 89, at 542–46 (proposing development of global standards
for securities holding infrastructures to be led by IOSCO).
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NPS Accommodation and Coexistence with Use of Investor
Securities (Rehypothecation, Securities Lending, and the United
States Customer Protection Rule) and Treatment of Fails to
Deliver

A principal challenge for the adoption of any direct-holding system
for securities, including the NPS, would be the accommodation and
preservation of the flexibility afforded by the various and sundry practices
generically referred to as the “use of investor securities” by securities
intermediaries. As a prime example, the following discussion focuses on
how the NPS could coexist with the Customer Protection Rule (CPR)
applicable to broker-dealers in the United States.228 Another challenge
would be to structure a direct-holding system so as to avoid unnecessary
disruption of current approaches to “fails to deliver” and “fails to receive”
securities in the settlement process. As explained above, customer
accounts in the United States normally are credited with securities even
though the relevant securities have not yet been received in settlement.229
The following discussion illustrates how this flexibility could be
maintained under the NPS. As noted above, other proponents of directholding systems have essentially ignored these problems.230
The discussion requires a brief overview of the CPR (for ease of
explanation this general summary takes considerable liberty toward
simplification).231 The basic operative rule provides: “A broker or dealer
shall promptly obtain and shall thereafter maintain the physical possession
or control of all fully-paid securities and excess margin securities carried
by a broker or dealer for the account of customers.”232 “Fully-paid
securities” are those for which a customer has made full payment and are
credited to a securities account in which the broker-dealer does not have a
security interest (or as to which there is no secured obligation
outstanding).233 Securities other than fully-paid securities and credited to a
228. See supra Part II (discussing CPR, margin lending, and securities lending).
229. See supra Part II (discussing fails to deliver/receive).
230. See supra Part IV (discussing other proposals).
231. See Mooney, supra note 66, at 166–82 (providing a brief overview of the Customer
Protection Rule and its effects in the case of a broker-dealer insolvency proceeding). See
Michael P. Jamroz, The Customer Protection Rule, 57 BUS. LAW. 1069 (2002) (providing a
more detailed examination).
232. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(1)(b) (2019) (emphasis added). For cash balances owed by
the broker-dealer to the customer, the broker-dealer must “back up” its obligation by
maintaining a special reserve account with cash or government securities according to a
reserve formula. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-3(a), (e)(1) (2019).
233. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(a)(3) (2019).
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securities account (a “margin account”) in which the broker-dealer does
have a security interest are “margin securities.”234 “Excess margin
securities” are margin securities with “a market value in excess of 140
percent of” the account holder’s secured obligation to the broker dealer.235
For example, if securities valued at $200 are credited to a customer’s
margin account and the secured debt owed to the broker-dealer is $100, the
value of the “excess margin securities” is $60 (the market value in excess
of 140 percent of $100, or $140). It follows that the broker-dealer must
maintain possession and control236 of the relevant securities of a value of at
least $60. It may “use” the securities valued of up to $140 (non-excess
margin securities) by granting a security interest to a lender (a so-called
“repledge” or “rehypothecation”) or by “lending” the securities.237
Although the broker-dealer must maintain possession and control of the
excess margin securities valued at $60, those securities would remain
subject to the broker-dealer’s security interest.
The nub of the problem in reconciling the NPS (or any direct-holding
system) with the CPR and current treatment of fails to deliver is
straightforward. First, it must be possible for securities directly registered
in the name an investor in the NPS nonetheless to be effectively held by a
broker-dealer as collateral—perfection by designation under the NPS
would meet this requirement.238 The securities also must be freely
transferable by the broker-dealer, for example for purposes of repledge or
securities lending. Second, securities that are not received in the settlement
process would not be available for registration in the name of an acquiring
investor under the NPS. Potential solutions to this problem are not so
straightforward, but viable and effective approaches are available.
I do not advocate here that this flexibility should be retained, primarily
because affirmatively making the empirical case that the benefits would
outweigh the costs is beyond the scope of this article. Maintaining current
approaches would preserve and impose on broker-dealers, investors, and
234. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(a)(4) (2019).
235. Id.
236. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-3(b), (c) (2019).
237. See Mooney, supra note 66 (explaining securities lending transactions). The
broker-dealer’s “use” of securities is not without other restrictions for the protection of the
customer, however. For example, the broker-dealer’s borrowings against customer
securities must be entered as a credit in its reserve account. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3a
(2019). In addition, under the so-called “hypothecation restriction,” the broker-dealer is not
permitted to pledge its account holders’ securities to secure indebtedness in an amount
“which exceeds the aggregate indebtedness of all customers in respect of securities carried
for their accounts.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.8c-1(a)(3), 240.15c2-1(a)(3) (2019).
238. See supra Part V.B.4.
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regulators the considerable complexity inherent in the CPR. But if such
flexibility is politically necessary for the implementation of the NPS, the
following analysis demonstrates the feasibility of the NPS-CPR
coexistence. Moreover, aside from political expediency, the benefits to
broker-dealers and customers of access to credit through margin lending
may well justify the maintenance of the current structure (or at least a
system with equivalent flexibility).239 With this in mind, consider two
alternative approaches, the goals of which would be to maximize the extent
of direct registration of investor holdings while maintaining the flexibility
and benefits of the current system.
The first alternative would be to require margin accounts to be
maintained by broker-dealers under a system equivalent to the current
regime. Excess margin securities (in the example, valued at $60) could be
registered in the investor’s name under the NPS, subject to the brokerdealer’s security interest designated in the NPS, but for purposes of the
CPR the excess margin securities would be treated as if they were credited
to the margin account. The non-excess margin securities (in the example,
valued at $140) would be credited to the customer’s actual margin
account.240 Inasmuch as holding securities in the legacy intermediated
system would remain as an available option after implementation of the
NPS, this approach would not be problematic from an operational
standpoint. But it obviously would dilute the effectiveness and benefits of
the NPS by disqualifying the non-excess margin securities from the NPS
direct-holding system. Moreover, it is possible that the costs of
implementing and administering the NPS would not be warranted if those
securities were made ineligible.
A second alternative may be more promising: All margin securities
would be eligible for holding under the NPS. Instead of a “margin
account” maintained by a broker-dealer under the legacy holding system,
an investor could establish a “synthetic margin account” with a brokertransactor as a feature of the NPS. Under this arrangement, the investor
and broker-dealer would agree to the securities held in the NPS that would
be covered by the synthetic account. These could include, for example, all
securities of any issue held by the investor in the NPS, securities only of
specified issues and up to any specified number or amount, or a specified
number or amount of a specified issue of securities. The covered securities
239. It seems clear that the CPR lowers the broker-dealers’ costs of funding margin
loans, but I have not investigated the extent to which these cost savings are passed on to
customer borrowers.
240. This approach is reminiscent of the Benjamin-Gullifer proposal for a bifurcated
holding system. See Benjamin & Gullifer, supra note 61, at 217–22, 233–36.
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would be subject to a security interest in favor of the broker-dealer
perfected by designation under the NPS. Calculation of fully paid
securities, excess margin securities, and non-excess margin securities and
the operation of the reserve account under the CPR would be applicable to
these synthetic margin accounts as if they were conventional margin
accounts.
The broker-transactor could grant a security interest in (repledge or
rehypothecate) any of the covered securities in favor of a funds lender to
the broker-transactor by designation perfection under the NPS while the
investor remained the registered holder.241 For securities lending, however,
the securities would be removed from the investor’s holdings and
transferred to the securities borrower under the NPS.242 In this respect the
securities lending transaction would not mimic its equivalent under the
conventional margin account approach, which normally would not involve
debiting (removing) the securities from the investor’s account.243 Unlike
the repledge situation, in the case of securities lending there would be no
basis for the investor in a direct-holding structure to retain any present
proprietary interest in the securities loaned.
The discussion of synthetic margin accounts under the NPS thus far
has embraced (albeit implicitly) the simplifying assumption that the
repledges and lending of non-excess margin securities and the withholding
of transfers to investors in the NPS (on account of fails to receive) would
involve securities that are identified to particular investors. Of course, this
is not actually how the system works. Currently broker-dealers need not
allocate securities that are repledged, loaned, or fail to receive securities to
any particular customer accounts. This reflects, at least in part, the
convention of not debiting customers’ accounts to reflect securities that are
241. Consistent with the concept of a synthetic margin account, these repledges would be
subject to the CPR requirements relating to the reserve account and the hypothecation
restriction. See Mooney, supra note 66, at 173–74.
242. A securities borrower also could require that the securities be transferred to it by
crediting its securities account maintained under the legacy holding system.
243. This deviation would be ameliorated by the creation of a corresponding “securities
receivable” credit by the broker-dealer in favor of the investor, secured by the reserve fund,
as discussed below in this subpart. In a system that respects “title-transfer” security, unlike
under the UCC, “repledge” by transfer of legal title to a funds lender could proceed as with
securities lending under any applicable rules analogous to the CPR—removal of the
securities from the investor’s holdings and, if applicable, a corresponding “securities
receivable” credit reflecting the broker-dealer’s right (as debtor) of redemption or return of
the securities upon payment of the secured obligation. Mooney, supra note 66, at 173–74.
Perfection of security interests in the United States by outright transfer to the creditor should
be treated in an identical fashion to securities lending, which might require conforming
adjustments to the CPR in this context.

440

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 22:2

loaned, and crediting customer accounts for securities that have not yet
been received. It also reflects the treatment of securities held in fungible
bulk by broker-dealers in omnibus accounts.
In order to replicate the current regime through the convention of
synthetic margin accounts within the NPS, it would be necessary to adopt
some method of allocating repledges, securities lending, and fails to receive
to specific synthetic margin account investors of a broker-transactor. One
approach would be for a repledge of securities or loans of an issue to be
allocated proportionally among all of the broker-dealer’s synthetic margin
account investors holding that issue.244 Fails to receive might be allocated
in similar fashion by proportional deduction from holders of securities not
received. But a more coherent approach for fails might be to withhold
credits in the NPS proportionally to those that would have been made to the
holdings of acquiring investors had the securities been received. For
purposes of this discussion it is not necessary to propose an optimal
resolution of all possible approaches to these allocations. The essential
point is that in the direct-holding environment of the NPS, unlike under the
legacy holding system, these allocations would be necessary.
In the case of repledge, securities lending, and fails to receive, under
the legacy system in the United States an entitlement holder whose
securities are affected retains nonetheless some proprietary rights, although
not necessarily in the securities per se.245 In the case of repledged
securities, as with all securities in which the intermediary holds a security
interest, the account holder has the right to a credit of the relevant
securities, free and clear, upon satisfaction of its indebtedness to the
intermediary (the broker-transactor margin lender). In the case of loaned
securities, the entitlement holder likewise has the right to the benefit of the
loaned securities once returned and, in the meantime, the benefit of the
cash collateral held in the reserve account. Similarly, in the case of fails to
receive, the entitlement holder is entitled to receive the securities once
delivered in the settlement process. All of these rights are reflected
currently by an actual credit of the relevant securities in the entitlement
holder’s securities account.
244. For example, assume there were 15 synthetic margin accounts for a broker-dealer as
to which 20,000 A Co. shares were held by investors, with 5 investors holding 2,000 shares
each and 10 investors holding 1,000 shares each. If 5,000 shares were repledged by
designation or loaned to borrowers (25% of the total A Co. shares), then 500 shares would
be designated for or removed from each of the 2,000 share investors and 250 shares for or
from each of the 1,000 share investors.
245. The entitlement holder’s rights would be those afforded by UCC Article 8 by virtue
of the credit to its securities account and under Article 9 by virtue of its status as a debtor.
See supra notes 33–41 (discussing security entitlements under UCC Article 8).
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Replicating the current system through synthetic margin accounts
under the NPS would require a method for formally reflecting these
investor assets (i.e., the value of the analogous rights of entitlement holders
just described). An investor’s rights in securities subject to the brokertransactor’s security interest and any repledges would be adequately
memorialized by the investor’s direct holdings of the securities in the NPS.
However, an investor’s right to the return of its proportionate allocation of
loaned securities and to be credited with its portion of securities received
pursuant to earlier fails are direct obligations of its synthetic margin
account broker-transactor.
These obligations may be properly
characterized as “securities receivables” of investors. Each such brokertransactor would be obliged to maintain a record of the receivables
(deliverables, from the broker-dealer’s perspective) of each of its synthetic
margin account investors, valued and marked-to-market daily. As under
the current system, a broker-dealer necessarily will know, and its records
will reflect, these obligations and values. The new wrinkle would be the
maintenance of records in the NPS of each investor’s securities
receivables.246 Mind you, this is not intermediation. The securities
receivables are not security entitlements and do not represent any present
interests in the underlying securities. They are, functionally, derivative
contracts with values based on underlying securities to be delivered by the
dealer-transactor in the NPS in the future. These are obligations borne by
an investor’s synthetic margin account broker-transactor, which for this
purpose may be conceptualized as the “issuer” of these receivables
(deliverables) within the NPS structure.247
To be sure, this précis of synthetic margin accounts operating within
the current environment of the CPR and settlement infrastructure reflects a
complicated architecture of interrelated rights and obligations. But the
beneficiaries of the current intermediated holding system in the United
States, the broker-dealers who would champion the CPR, are in no position
to whine about complexity. Currently, the rights of entitlement holders are
246. Given the applicable regulation and supervision of broker-dealers there would be no
reason to mandate that the records in the NPS reflecting an investor’s holdings of securities
receivables contain an itemization of the particular securities involved or the details of the
underlying transactions.
247. Treatment of these securities receivable in an insolvency proceeding of the brokerdealer obligor (likely under the Bankruptcy Code and the SIPA in the United States) should
be addressed. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing intermediary insolvencies). Although these
investor securities receivable claims would not be customer claims, the investors should
receive the benefit of the reserve fund and any backstops supporting fails to receive in the
settlement process, to the end that they would be treated to that extent as secured creditors.
Statutory adjustments would be needed to achieve this result.
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intentionally, not accidentally or inadvertently, cloaked behind the blunt
instrument of crediting securities to securities accounts and the byzantine,
nearly impenetrable black box of the CPR. Whether one considers this
conception of synthetic margin accounts as a practical approach for dealing
with several deficiencies of the current infrastructure (as I do) or a
metaphorical thought experiment, it offers an accurate and useful (and,
perhaps, disturbing) unveiling of the rights of entitlement holders in
connection with margin accounts.
VI.

THE NEW PLATFORM AND DLT: A FINTECH PRIMORDIAL SOUP

This Part considers the potential for adopting a DLT-based system for
the operation of the NPS. In particular, the discussion focuses on the
essential functions and attributes of the NPS in the context of DLT rather
than the details of the technology itself. Perhaps more importantly, it also
explains how the NPS might provide a logistical and political path (a
metaphorical “primordial soup”248) for the ultimate adoption of DLT in the
broader processes for trading, clearing, settlement, and holding of financial
assets—whether or not the NPS itself were to adopt DLT either initially or
at some future point.
The core functions of the NPS are (i) the direct connection of
participating investors and their securities holdings with the issuers of the
securities, which necessarily implicates the direct connection of these
issuers to, and their direct participation in, the NPS, (ii) the direct
connection of investors with other investors within the NPS, which would
accommodate inter-investor transfers of assets within the NPS, (iii) the
direct connection of investors with their (existing or subsequently retained)
broker-transactors within the NPS, so as to facilitate the acquisition and
disposition of assets into and out of the NPS pursuant to market
transactions and the existing settlement infrastructure, and (iv) the direct
connection of the NPS (and, necessarily, its participants—the investors,
issuers, and broker-transactors) with the existing systems for trading,
clearing, and settlement of market transactions and with the participants in
those systems.
The essential attributes of the NPS are (i) a seamless, automatic
248. The metaphor, of course, refers to the theory that life on Earth began billions of
years ago in a warm pond or ocean from chemicals that form amino acids which, in turn,
form proteins. The Primordial Soup Theory, PRIMORDIAL SOUP, http://leiwenwu.tripod.com
/primordials.htm [https://perma.cc/UX7K-TLDH].
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interface with existing settlement systems (and their participants, including
exchanges and other trading platforms), issuers’ books (registers) for
securities, and broker-transactors, (ii) accurate, error-free, “hack-proof,”
definitive records of indisputable ownership of securities within NPS and
that constitute the books (registers) of issuers, (iii) exclusive investor
access and control over dispositions (transfers) of securities, (iv) real-time,
free transfer of securities within the NPS or for release to a brokertransactor (which constitute transfers on the issuers’ books) for disposition
outside the NPS, and (v) transactions and transaction records within the
NPS (and consequently on the issuers’ books) that would mimic precisely
currently permissible transactions (e.g., transfers to another investor or
security interests and repledges of securities) as permitted under the
applicable law.
I take no position here on the details of the technology that would
support these functions and attributes of the NPS, including whether it
should adopt a DLT-based system. However, many of the characteristics
for which DLT has been extolled would serve well these core functions and
essential attributes. The NPS could benefit from DLT’s potential for
efficiency, speed, reduced transactions costs, increased accuracy, enhanced
security, and improved regulatory compliance and oversight.249 These
potential benefits have led Fintech proponents of DLT to shift the
conversation away from Bitcoin and crypto-currencies and towards the
practical utility of DLT for other, broader applications in the financial
markets.250 One asserted appeal of DLT is that it need not be maintained in
the traditional sense by any one central administrator, thereby eliminating
counterparty and other intermediary risks.251 However, in the context of
financial markets, the implementation of DLT almost certainly would
involve a “permissioned” ledger; in the case of the NPS the participants
would include the system operators, CSDs, broker-transactors, and other
trusted institutions as well as issuers and investors.252 Unrestricted,
249. For a thoughtful and realistic assessment of the potential for DLT in the context of
securities settlement and holding, see Sarah Green & Ferdisha Snagg, Intermediated
Securities and Distributed Ledger Technology, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 338–58
(Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019).
250. Id. at 341 (discussing “‘tokenization’ of securities: i.e. the use of virtual tokens to
constitute or represent ‘traditional’ securities”).
251. Id. at 358 (“DLT offers the potential for major changes in the way that securities are
both held and settled. Primary amongst these is the possibility of reducing, or even
eliminating, the role of intermediaries.”).
252. In contrast, an ‘unpermissioned’ ledger is accessible to the public and the platform
is not controlled or regulated by any one owner. Bitcoin is an example of an
unpermissioned ledger. See Tim Swanson, Consensus-as-a-Service: A Brief Report on the
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unpermissioned consensus models similar to Bitcoin would not be likely to
satisfy legal and regulatory concerns.253 Even so, because investors would
have direct access to and participate in the NPS, considerable security
concerns must be addressed.254
Notwithstanding these DLT-related developments, expressions of
interest, and hype, the question remains as to what role (if any) DLT could
or should play in the NPS. A central and distinctive attribute of DLT is the
collective operation of a network by participants using cryptography for the
processing and validating of transactions.255 The claim is that the
consensus achieved through collective accounting and the application of
complex algorithms ensures the legitimacy of transactions. But one might
seriously question the significance of this attribute of DLT for the operation
of the NPS (at least as an initial, potentially interim step as envisaged here).
In particular, the crucial input of securities into the NPS and the
simultaneous and corresponding assignments of proprietary interests in
securities to investors would emanate directly from the existing legacy
settlement systems, from existing legacy issuer registers, or from banks
holding in legacy systems.
Nothing within the subsequent operation of the NPS could enhance
the accuracy or validity of this central, organic input of financial assets—
which would be what it is, NPS or no NPS. However, transactions (entries

Emergence of Permissioned, Distributed Ledger Systems, GREAT WALL NUMBERS (Apr. 6,
2015), https://www.ofnumbers.com/2015/04/06/consensus-as-a-service-a-brief-report-on-th
e-emergence-of-permissioned-distributed-ledger-systems/ [https://perma.cc/G6RK-A92M].
Note that Geis, D&M, and PB&A also contemplate permissioned DLT platforms. Geis,
supra note 125, at 264; Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 15;
Panisi, Buckley & Arner, supra note 135, at 23.
253. Philipp Paech explained the crucial roles of law and regulation for DLT platforms
in his important 2017 article. Philipp Paech, The Governance of Blockchain Financial
Networks, 80 MODERN L. REV. 1073 passim (2017).
254. For example, the NPS necessarily would involve participation by investors screened
under know-your-customer rules to the extent that access would be allowed through
permissioned broker-transactors or otherwise identified as eligible for holding in the NPS.
See, e.g., PWC, KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER: QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE (2016), https://www.pwc
.com/gx/en/financial-services/publications/assets/pwc-anti-money-laundering-2016.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/BZ2K-4F9Q]. Obviously, cybersecurity is a concern, but there is no reason
why a move to a DLT-based system would necessarily increase that risk. This issue is one
of many for the RFP to FinTech.
255. DLT systems all feature a form of asymmetric key cryptography, which requires the
use of public-private keys for the submission of data. See HARISH NATARAJAN, SOLVEJ
KARLA KRAUSE & HELEN LUSKIN GRADSTEIN, WORLD BANK GRP., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER
TECHNOLOGY (DLT) AND BLOCKCHAIN (2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1
77911513714062215/pdf/122140-WP-PUBLIC-Distributed-Ledger-Technology-and-Bloc
kchain-Fintech-Notes.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BTW-LSYQ].
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of data) following and building upon these inputs might well benefit from a
DLT-based system. Investors necessarily would have access to the NPS
and the ability to execute transfers within the system. I leave to others the
assessment of the respective roles of DLT and legacy technology in this
setting. It may well be that legacy technology would be up to the task of
performing the essential functions of the NPS, at least as contemplated here
for its initial functions.256 For now, it is sufficient to issue an RFP to the
Fintech community to address the goals and functions of the NPS.257
That said, it is necessary to address the issue of exclusive investor
access and control over securities and the potential implications of DLT for
that core attribute of the NPS. Were the NPS to embrace DLT as the
technology for acquiring and disposing of securities—assets that have an
existence exogenous to the NPS—the interests in securities held through
the NPS would be a form of digital assets (or cryptoassets).
Notwithstanding oft-repeated and hyped rhetorical and ideological
aspirations for DLT to eliminate intermediation in financial markets,
experience has shown that this claim for DLT has not been realized in the
context of digital assets. For many investors the only practical means of
holding digital assets is through some form of custodial relationship—
intermediated holding. This is because most investors could not practically
deal with the unwieldy and unfriendly public-private key architecture that
has become the norm for direct (as opposed to intermediated) access and
control over digital assets in the DLT environment.258 Implementation of
256. See DTCC Report, supra note 14, at 20 (describing how [current financial
infrastructures] have endured for decades and operate seamlessly and efficiently to ensure
the smooth operation of the world’s financial markets. Any failure in the highly
orchestrated processing of transactions that occurs seamlessly every day could literally grind
the world’s financial markets to a halt and disrupt economies globally. Significant change
to this infrastructure must be carefully considered.). DTCC’s conclusion is that a mature,
supported, integrated distributed ledger technology has the potential to help improve a
number of existing financial market infrastructure limitations. However, it may not be the
solution to every problem because there may be alternative opportunities to lower the costs
and risks of current infrastructure by standardizing industry workflows and expanding the
use of cloud technologies.
257. See Mooney, supra note 257, at 2 (“Those experienced with secured transactions in
the credit markets . . . may have much to offer by way of identifying the goals and
requirements that registries must address. But once these needs are identified, it is for
fintech to determine how the application of technology might address these needs. Secured
transactions experts are well positioned to issue to the fintech sector metaphorical requests
for proposals for technology-related structural reforms of secured transactions regimes. It is
up to the fintech sector to devise and propose such reforms—or concede that it is unable to
do so”).
258. For a brief overview of issues and problems relating to custody of and access to
digital assets, see Henry Chong & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The New Intermediation: Digital
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the NPS would require that investors have accessible and user-friendly
direct and exclusive control over securities held in the system. This
challenge must be met whether or not the NPS adopts a DLT-based
approach. But it is plausible that developments facilitating better
disintermediated access to digital assets would have utility for the NPS
even if it did not adopt DLT for its operations.259
The NPS in its initial modality as envisaged here would leave much of
the legacy trading and settlement systems intact. Business, cultural, legal,
technological, and other barriers to direct holding could be overcome in a
non-disruptive way through implementation of the NPS. Even if the NPS
were initially implemented by employing legacy technology, it could
nonetheless serve as a primordial soup for a more full-blown DLT-based
system covering the broad range of financial market processes—trading,
clearing, settlement, and holding. This role of the NPS in “priming the
pump” for the application of DLT to a more comprehensive system would
derive from and build upon the NPS function of directly connecting issuers
of securities, investors, broker-transactors, banks, and CSD/CCP settlement
systems.
As discussed in Part VII, whether NPS is implemented should be
influenced substantially by conclusions of regulators and market
participants that the NPS is justified on a cost-benefit basis by its goals of
addressing the significant problems of intermediary risk, custody-chain
risk, and the other risks and costs of intermediated holding. But another
stand-alone and important influence should be the prime-the-pump,
primordial-soup rationale for the NPS just outlined.260 This potential
transformational role of the NPS in bringing together all of the significant
market participants and institutions is of central importance.
Assets (June 26, 2019) (unpublished presentation) (on file with author). See also Jonathan
B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, New Special Study of the Securities Markets: Financial
Intermediaries 3–5 (July 14, 2017), https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsi
tes/capital-markets/berk-vanbinsbergen-final_draft.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QK99-ET5L]
(illustrating that over the past few decades in the United States the share of corporate
equities held by households and nonprofits has declined substantially and the holdings by
institutional investors have correspondingly increased). Although this development may
ameliorate the potential problems of access to digital assets in a direct-holding system such
as the NPS, there remain many non-institutional holders of intermediated securities.
259. See Seth Rosenblatt & Jason Cipriani, Two-factor Authentication: What You Need
to Know (FAQ), CNET (June 15, 2015), https://www.cnet.com/news/two-factor-authenticati
on-what-you-need-to-know-faq/ (discussing the two-factor identification process in the evoting project led by Nasdaq and Tallinn Stock Exchange).
260. See infra Part VII (noting that the adoption or even potential adoption of a DLTbased NPS (or other transparent or direct-holding infrastructure) could empower new
stakeholders that could affect the political economy analysis of reforms).
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POLITICAL ECONOMY CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING NEW
PLATFORM SYSTEM: OPPOSITION OF ENTRENCHED INTERESTS,
PATH DEPENDENCE, AND STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES

There is no doubt that intermediaries, including CSDs, strongly favor
maintaining the status quo in markets that feature securities holding
infrastructures embracing deep intermediation and omnibus securities
accounts. This Part considers this phenomenon as well as two additional
structural artifacts that discourage transparency and direct holding reforms.
One such structural impediment to direct holding of debt securities in the
United States and Europe is the prevailing structure of debt obligations
evidenced by “global certificates” registered to a CSD or nominee of a
CSD. Another obstacle is the requirement that investment companies in
the United States hold securities with bank custodians. These examples of
mandatory intermediation have not been addressed by earlier commentary
on disintermediation. I outline below plausible means for modifying and
overcoming these impediments.
Nougayrède offers an excellent and concise overview of the political
economy aspects of potential reforms.261 She describes the many bases for
securities industry opposition (focusing primarily on Europe) to increased
transparency (“expanded account segregation”) and the industry’s
preference for omnibus accounting structures.262 It is a safe assumption
that this opposition would be even stronger in the case of proposals for
direct holding. She then explains the many reasons why reforms that
would impose transparency would be difficult, canvassing the views of a
variety of observers. Recommendations for reform by experts external to
the industry would confront “strong-form legal path dependence.”263 She
notes Donald’s explanation that disintermediating issuer registration of
shares would involve a clash between arguments based on disparate
disciplines and “path-induced perceptions of ‘normal’ mechanisms.”264
But the core obstacle to transparency and direct-holding reforms is the
influence of the powerful intermediaries and CSDs.265 Nougayrède
261. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 308–11.
262. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 291–95.
263. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 308 (citing and quoting Mark Roe, Chaos and
Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 651–52, 659 (1996)).
264. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 308–09 (citing and quoting Donald, supra note 87, at
99).
265. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 309. See also Kathryn Judge, Intermediary
Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (2015) (explaining negative influences of intermediaries);
Milne, supra note 67, at 352 (observing that the complexity the current infrastructure
“entrenches the market power of securities brokers, at the expense of higher charges to final
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concludes that reform would require a transformation of the political
economy that would involve a greater role for experts outside the industry
and a quantification of the costs and benefits of reform.266 She offers a
useful menu of policy considerations that ought to figure into the analysis.
These include the issue of investor identification versus anonymity, the
regulatory goal of stability, and wider social interests such as money
laundering, terrorist financing, sanctions compliance, and tax evasion and
revenue concerns.267
Although Nougayrède expresses optimism for reforms, she does not
identify a clear path forward.268 Others, including D&M, have recognized
that, given the prevailing headwinds, reforms will require some form of
top-down, regulatory intervention. I agree. D&M recognize that the
current holding system in the United States works well for its owners, the
intermediaries, but not for investors and issuers.269 For that reason they
direct their proposal for a DLT-based direct-holding system270 “mainly to
regulators, whose duties run to the broader market, rather than to the direct
heirs of legacy arrangements and of the rents accrued from the same.”271
Donald’s description and assessment of the pathetic saga of the DTCC
Direct Registration System (DRS) is illuminating.272 As Donald explains,
this was originally “an issuer-driven project designed to restore
transparency and shareholder communications.”273 However, as a result of

investors”).
266. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 309.
267. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 309–11.
268. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 312.
269. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 23–25, 38; see also
Donald, supra note 87, at 88–93 (discussing current holding system).
270. See supra Part IV (discussing the D&M proposal). Although I expressed strong
criticism of the D&M proposal there, I strongly agree with Donald’s critique of the role and
influence of intermediaries.
271. Donald & Miraz, Restoring Direct Holdings, supra note 87, at 38.
272. Donald, supra note 87, at 89–91.
273. Donald, supra note 87, at 89. By way of background, in 1990 the G-30 U.S.
Working Group considered a proposal that contemplated a Direct Registration Clearing
System (DRCS). For a description and analysis, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Property,
Credit, and Regulation Meet Information Technology: Clearance and Settlement in the
Securities Markets, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 142–45, 149–55 (1992). DRCS would
have provided an optional direct connection between issuers and their shareholders and
would have enhanced the roles of transfer agents beyond the traditional direct holding
structures. Id. at 149–50. Issuers and their transfer agents favored the DRCS proposal but
DTC and broker-dealers opposed the proposal. Id. DTC was concerned about the high
costs of automation for including a large number of transfer agents in the system. Id. at 150
n.65. The broker-dealers apparently viewed it as a threat to their business models, which
rely on more-or-less “captive” customers. They apparently feared that more portable
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DTC control, DRS is now “a service option of DTCC, to which DTC
regulates access and for which issuers now pay fees.”274 As Donald
concludes, the DRS now “offers little more than a parking lot for
untransferable shares—if a shareholder wants liquidity, he must place the
shares back” into the system.275 The DRS example underscores the point
made in Part II: The intermediaries and CSDs have little incentive to
remove obstacles to portability of securities in and out of the system, and
they have every incentive to keep securities in the intermediated systems
that they control. On the other hand, when it would increase the efficiency
and lower the costs of the specific relationship between DTC itself and
issuers of securities, DTC has indeed invested in reforms and innovation
affecting direct-holding relationships.276
Also reflecting the dominance of the DTCC, debt securities held in the
DTCC system in the United States typically adopt DTC’s “book-entry
only” (BEO) structure. Under this structure the securities are registered in
the name of DTC’s nominee, Cede & Co., and a global certificate is issued
for the aggregate principal amount of an issue and deposited with DTC.277
The key attributes of the BEO structure are that “(i) physical certificates are
not available to investors and (ii) DTC, through its nominee, Cede & Co.,
will hold the entire balance of the offering.”278 Obviously, BEO securities
securities would allow customers to change their brokerage relationships more easily. Id. at
150 n.68. Notwithstanding this opposition, in 1994 the SEC asked the securities industry to
consider the development of a direct registration system that would employ uncertificated
securities. In 2006, the New York Stock Exchange amended its Listed Company Manual to
require listed companies to make their securities eligible for DRS. NYSE, Listed Company
Manual §§ 501.00 (listing mandatory eligibility of listed securities for DRS), 601.01(A)(13)
(stating that listed company’s transfer agent must be eligible for DRS); see Paul Weiss
Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP, NYSE Proposes Amendments to Mandate Eligibility to
Participate in a Direct Registration System (June 20, 2006) (describing requirement for
public companies to make securities eligible for DRS). NASDAQ adopted a similar rule:
NASDAQ Equity Rule 5255.
274. Donald, supra note 87, at 89.
275. Donald, supra note 87, at 91.
276. See The FAST Program, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/settlement-and-asset-services
/agent-services/fast [https://perma.cc/N3TV-BV44] (describing DTC’s Fast Automated
Securities Transfer Program (FAST) as “a contract between DTC and transfer agents that
eliminates the movement of physical securities by allowing agents to act as custodians for
DTC”).
277. Sample Offering Document Language Describing Book-Entry Only Issuance, DTC
(June 2013), www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/issue.../Sample-Language.ashx
[https://perma.cc/CXQ6-42FE]. However, if the aggregate principal amount of an issue
exceeds $500 million, additional certificates of $500 million or the remaining amount of the
issue will be issued. Id.
278. DTC, OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, REQUIREMENTS FOR BOOK-ENTRY ONLY
(“BEO”) SECURITIES (2019), www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/issue.../operati
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would be incompatible with the direct-holding structure of the NPS.
However, it is not unusual for trust indentures governing debt securities in
the United States to permit an issuer and an indenture trustee to amend the
indentures if the security holders would not be adversely affected.279 Given
this flexibility, it is quite plausible that the SEC could mandate that issuers
of BEO securities undertake best efforts to amend the terms of the
securities so as to permit beneficial holders to elect to hold through the
NPS (or another direct-holding mechanism).280
The use of bank custodians for holding securities by investment
companies and investment advisors in the United States is another example
of mandatory intermediation. Pursuant to the custody requirement of
section 17(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,281 “nearly all
investment companies use a bank custodian” for holding securities.282 This
onal-arrangements.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY9Q-C4RS].
279. See, e.g., ABA Ad Hoc Comm. for Revision of the 1983 Model Simplified
Indenture, Revised Model Simplified Indenture, 55 BUS. LAW. 1115, 1146 (2000) (“The
Company and the Trustee may amend this Indenture or the Securities without the consent of
any Securityholder: . . . to make any change that does not adversely affect the rights of any
Securityholder.”) (emphasis added); NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, FORM INDENTURE §
10.01, https://www.nabl.org/portals/0/documents/nablformalreportsmodeldocs-nablformtrus
tindenture.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5R9-JNCJ] (“The Issuer and the Trustee may from time to
time and at any time enter into trust indentures supplemental to this Indenture, without the
consent of or notice to any Bondholder, to effect any one or more of the following:. . . .
make any other change herein that is determined by the Trustee to be not materially adverse
to the interests of the Bondholders [and which does not involve a change described in
Section 10.02 requiring consents of specific Bondholders.”) (emphasis added). For similar
provisions under English law bonds, see Debt Capital Markets: Trustees—Overview,
LEXISPSL, https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/bankingandfinance/document/391289/57
FJ-2NP1-F185-X1W1-00000-00/Debt_capital_markets__trustees_overview# (“A trustee
usually has discretion to. . .agree to a modification (proposed by the issuer) to the provisions
of the trust deed . . . without the consent or sanction of the holders of the debt securities
(provided the modification . . . is not materially prejudicial to the interests of the holders of
the debt securities).”).
280. Arguably permitting optional direct holding in the NPS could have adverse
consequences for those beneficial holders who continue to hold indirectly. However, a
carefully constructed amendment could avoid that result. For example, even if there were
an explicit or implicit obligation of debt security holders to share ratably with other security
holders any non-ratable recoveries from the issuer, that obligation could be imposed on NPS
direct holders.
281. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(f) (2018).
282. THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., 1 REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES § 8.02[2][a]
(2014). While it is also permissible for investment companies to use broker-dealers as
custodians and to “self-custody,” those alternatives currently involve burdensome
requirements that make them impractical for most investment companies. See id. §
8.02[2][b] (broker-dealer custody), (c) (self-custody). Similar requirements exist for
investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-18b
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custody requirement arose out of Congressional concerns about investment
company management abuses such as commingling of company and
personal assets.283 While suggesting that the SEC should permit noncustodial holding284 through something like the NPS might seem radical, in
actuality whatever services and monitoring that bank custodians currently
provide could be provided under a direct-holding scenario. There is no
reason why a bank custodian need be an intermediary in the chain of title
for these purposes. For example, the SEC could condition an investment
company’s direct holding under the NPS on the retention of a bank for
providing services (other than intermediated holding) essentially identical
to what bank custodians currently offer.285
The foregoing suggests that implementing disintermediation286 most
likely would require regulatory intervention. The following discussion
proceeds on the plausible working assumption that the SEC would be the
appropriate agency to institute and coordinate such reforms.287 Academic
literature may offer insights concerning potential intervention on the

(2018); see Investor Bulletin: Custody of Your Investment Assets, SEC (Mar. 1, 2018), https:
//www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/bulletincustody.htm
[https://perma.cc/T7GX-JDF7]
(describing safeguards of the “custody rule”).
283. THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 282, § 8.02[1]. Given the risks that
intermediated holding imposes on investors, it is ironic (to say the least) that the custody
requirement has been thought to promote investor welfare.
284. The Investment Company Act permits self-custody “in accordance with such rules
and regulations or orders as the Commission may from time to time prescribe for the
protection of investors.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(f)(1) (2018). Recently a petition to the SEC
for rulemaking suggested that the SEC consider “allowing issuers or trading platforms to
use blockchain technology in lieu of banks as custodians,” which “could significantly
streamline securities trading and reduce transaction costs, producing savings for investors.”
Templum Mkts., LLC & Templum, Inc., Letter to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 18,
2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-736.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4YW-W
LWB].
285. During a meeting on February 22, 2018 that Thomas Keijser and I held with staff of
a global bank custodian, the staff expressed the view that the bank provides services through
the mechanism of intermediated holding of securities for its institutional investor clients
(which would include investment companies) because the currently applicable intermediated
holding systems make such holding the only practical alternative.
286. Reference here is to disintermediation as a very general concept, including a direct
holding infrastructure (such as the NPS) or some form of transparent system as well as the
amelioration of the two mandatory intermediation obstacles just discussed.
287. The SEC’s mandate would include taking into account costs and benefits outside of
those directly impacting the securities holding system, such as AML, in considering a
fundamental shift toward requiring or providing incentives for more direct holding and
transparency. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2018) (indicating that the SEC’s mandate includes
protection of “interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power . . . the
national banking system and Federal Reserve System”).
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discrete issues addressed here. For example, in their recent article Chris
Brummer and Yesha Yadav argue that the regulatory oversight of financial
innovation involves a “policy trilemma.”288 They claim that at best
regulators can achieve only two out of the three regulatory goals of
providing clear rules, maintaining market integrity, and encouraging
financial innovation.289 They advise regulators to avoid “the most extreme
trade-offs” and to “moderate opportunities and risks among the three policy
goals.”290 More specifically, they advocate “supplemental strategies” that
would encourage cooperation among domestic agencies, the setting of
international standards, and the “private self-governance of emerging
technologies.”291 These valuable injunctions no doubt have utility for
regulators. But this relatively high level of abstraction provides less
guidance to the SEC on the specifics of securities holding infrastructures.
David Wishnick’s nascent research on the financial infrastructure for
securities settlement is more promising.292
Wishnick surveys the
development of the securities settlement and holding infrastructure in the
United States.293 He analyzes the SEC’s authority over “back-office”
reforms and offers concrete suggestions for SEC involvement.294 In
particular, Wishnick suggests that “the SEC should consider making use of
the power to convene an expert Market Transactions Advisory Committee”
(MTAC), noting that the SEC has not used this power since the “early
1990s.”295 He astutely points out that the advisory committee approach
could provide “a focal point for interest groups other than the DTCC
membership to coordinate around, thereby changing the dynamics of the

288. Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadov, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO.
L.J. 235 passim (2019).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 297.
291. Id.
292. David A. Wishnick, Innovation and Securities Settlement Infrastructure (June 20,
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
293. Id. at 4–14
294. Id. at 25–27.
295. Id. at 29. He also suggests that the SEC make use of information that is to be
provided in the report due in September 2020 on the costs and benefits of the 2017
implementation of T+2 settlement and (consistent with the Brummer and Yadov
recommendations) that it engage in coordination with Treasury and the Fed. Id. The SEC’s
power to invoke an advisory committee is provided in section 17A(f) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(f) (2018). For background on the Market
Transactions Advisory Committee that began its work in 1991 (I was member), see
Mooney, Individuals, supra note 105, at 564–72. As detailed there, Section 17A(f) followed
a draft bill providing for an advisory committee prepared by Robert Mendelson, Egon
Guttman, and me in 1988. Id. at 564, 566–67.
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process.”296 This is exactly the sort of opening for influence of experts
outside of the intermediary/CSD community which Nougayrède suggests
may be necessary for meaningful reform.297 Even without the SEC’s
reconstitution of the MTAC, the currently active Investor Advisory
Committee (IAC) could play an important role in the process. The IAC has
a fairly wide charge to evaluate potential improvements in the securities
markets, and it has weighed in on securities settlement in the past
(advocating for T+1 settlement).298
An SEC advisory committee today, however, would face somewhat
greater obstacles than those confronting the MTAC of the 1990s. The
earlier incarnation of the MTAC, and in general the reform efforts of the
late 1980s and early 1990s culminating in revised UCC Article 8 and the
federal TRADES regulations, generally accepted the deeply intermediated
settlement and holding infrastructure as it then existed. It focused on
rationalizing the private-law rules for accommodating that infrastructure.299
A current SEC advisory committee might instead question and potentially
support reforms that would disrupt the current infrastructure. This potential
disruption likely would prompt opposition from the intermediary (brokerdealers and banks) and DTCC sectors of the industry. But an investigation
by an advisory committee with expert members and advisors external to the
industry would offer legitimacy, independence, and balance to counter
industry opposition, as contemplated by Nougayrède and Wishnick.300
Moreover, prospects for a DLT-based infrastructure (Fintech inspired or
otherwise) could energize and empower new stakeholders that might
296. Wishnick, supra note 292, at 29.
297. Nougayrède, supra note 44, at 309.
298. See SEC, Investor Advisory Committee, Recommendation of the Investor Advisory
Committee: Shortening the Trade Settlement Cycle in U.S. Financial Markets (Feb. 12,
2015), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/settlement-cycle-re
commendation-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2EP-GURU] (detailing the recommendation of
the Investor Advisory Committee on shortening the settlement cycle to a two-day settlement
period).
299. See generally Mooney, Individuals, supra note 105, at 559–76. That is not to say,
however, that the process was without controversy. See, e.g., id. at 571 n.89 (quoting
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Good Faith Transferees of U.S. Treasury Securities and Other
Weird Ideas: Making Federal Commercial Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 723 (1993)) (“It
is unfortunate that busy professionals must use valuable time to review and comment upon
the 1992 Proposed Regulations when that time might be more usefully spent revising Article
8.”).
300. The legitimacy and influence of an advisory committee also would be enhanced by
formal and informal participation and support from governmental bodies such as the
Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Securities Investor Protection Corporation and
from interest groups such as the American Association of Individual Investors, the
Association of Institutional Investors, and the Council of Institutional Investors.

454

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 22:2

provide a counterbalance to the influence of legacy sectors.301 Of course,
an advisory committee would engage in its own careful analysis of
potential costs and benefits of infrastructure reforms. Although the task
would be challenging, addressing industry complexity should be a high
priority for expert bodies in an administrative state.
Identifying and securing an appropriate forum for consideration of the
prospects for infrastructure reform would be a useful, indeed essential, first
step toward implementation. Given a proper forum and adequate
institutional backing, perhaps a consensus among stakeholders might be
forged or at least significant support might emerge for a more formal
review process. The Business Law Section of the American Bar
Association would be an excellent candidate for providing an informed and
influential forum for consideration of infrastructure reforms. Most relevant
stakeholder interests are well represented within the Section. Moreover,
the Section has an enviable track record as an honest broker in law
reform.302
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Intermediated holding imposes substantial risks and costs. Even
though these risks are fairly well managed by modern systems, this
management also imposes substantial costs that are ultimately borne by
investors and issuers. These deeply intermediated holding structures
primarily benefit intermediaries (brokers, banks, CSDs, and other
settlement-related organizations) that control the infrastructures and that
are resistant to changes that would undermine these benefits.
Disintermediation likely would require regulatory intervention.
Proposed reforms that would limit the disruption of current market
practices might encourage such intervention and blunt opposition.
Providing for an optional direct holding structure while preserving current
regimes for trading and settlement would offer the best prospect for nearterm reform. This approach also would create a “primordial soup” for
more extensive future reforms of trading and settlement systems. The NPS
proposal outlined here meets these needs. But I reiterate that the NPS is
only a proxy for a disintermediated system that would meet the functional
301. Cf. Mooney, supra note 89, at 541, 545 (arguing that the emergence of Fintech
interest in DLT make this a propitious time for considering basic changes in securities
holding infrastructures).
302. For example, the Section played a significant role in the process leading to the
major revision of UCC Article 8 and the federal regulations for book-entry government
securities in the early 1990s. See Mooney, Individuals, supra note 105, at 560–74.
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goals to which the NPS aspires. The actual attributes of a reformed
infrastructure could result only from intensive deliberations among all
stakeholders. No single proposal could reasonably aspire to foretell the
details of the infrastructure that might emerge.
This article makes several important contributions. It outlines
functionally the goals and features of the NPS direct holding system,
including acquisition, disposition, financing, investor rights, cross-border
issues, and market practices. This amounts to an RFP for Fintech to
achieve results necessary for an effective, safe, and efficient holding
system. Moreover, it explores political economy issues and challenges for
actual implementation of disintermediation in holding systems. In
particular, unlike some earlier proposals, it anticipates pushback from
powerful interests supporting the status quo and offers anticipatory
rebuttals. This approach forecloses industry criticism that it fails to
appreciate “how the system works,” that it is “impractical,” that it would
disrupt important aspects of financial markets, and that it is “utopian” or
“pie in sky.” Other reform advocacy that fails to anticipate such objections
is wanting, self-impeaching, and may actually undermine reform efforts.
The article also highlights the important distinction, often overlooked,
between merely transparent securities holding systems and direct-holding
infrastructures. Moreover, it finds the other proposals for reforming
financial infrastructure examined here wanting for their advocacy of DLTbased solutions without a careful comparative assessment of legacy
technology.
The article also explores and identifies several problems imposed by
intermediated holding that the NPS would resolve or improve by focusing
on post-settlement intermediated holding. These include intermediary risk
(including custody-chain risk), which the article puts front and center, the
exercise of investor rights, protection for the rights of creditors seeking
attachment of securities, and clunky private-law rules spawned by
intermediated holding. It also explains how the NPS could preserve and
deal with important market functions and practices and overcome
impediments to direct holding reforms. For example, it considers the
impact of reform on the use of securities (margin lending, securities
lending, rehypothecation), various nontransparency costs (AML, sanctions
compliance, taxation), and mandatory intermediation (CSD held debt
securities and bank custodians for investment companies).
Unlike earlier efforts, this article provides a more complete menu of
problems that an appropriate disintermediated holding infrastructure could
resolve or ameliorate. It offers a set of anticipatory responses to likely
objections to the NPS or other proposals for transparency or direct holding
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that other proponents have largely ignored. And it presents a roadmap for a
cost-benefit analysis that would take into account broader conceptions of
social welfare than typically are invoked in discussions of financial
infrastructure.303 In sum, Fintech may offer pathways to direct holding,
elimination of post-settlement intermediary risk, and remedies for the
various other problems spawned by deep intermediation of securities
holding and nontransparency while also preserving (or even enhancing) the
flexibility and efficiency offered by current legacy infrastructures.
However, until now Fintech has not been asked for holistic solutions for
achieving these desirable and needed results.

303. See Christopher Twemlow, Why Are Securities Held in Intermediated Form, in
INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 85–107 (Louise Gullifer & Jennifer Payne eds., 2019)
(offering a thorough, careful, and cogent articulation of the justifications for and benefits of
intermediated holding). However, Twemlow’s defense is grounded on path-dependent
assumptions about existing conditions and therefore is not responsive to the claims in
support of the NPS made here. Ultimately policy makers must make empirical assumptions
and determinations.

